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The Politics of Economic Restructuring 
in Mexico: Actors, Sequencing, and 
Coalition Change 
Maria Lorena Cook, Kevin J. Middlebrook, 
and Juan Molinar Horcasitas 
The parallel movements toward political democratization and economic 
liberalization that have swept many countries in Latin America, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Africa, since the early 1980s are a challenging 
subject of scholarly inquiryybifferent analysts have examined the 
origins and timing of these developments, the combinations of interna-
tional and domestic factors that produced such historically significant 
changes, and the interaction between political opening and market 
reforms (including trade and exchange rate liberalization, deregulation 
of commercial and investment opportunities, and privatization of state-
owned enterprises) in different national contexts. It is certainly the 
coincidence of shifts toward political democratization and economic 
liberalization that makes these developments a particularly compelling 
subject for students of comparative political economy. Wet in many 
instances, one of these processes clearly antedated the other, often by a 
substantial period of time. 
In recognition of this fact, some analysts underscore the potential 
importance that the sequencing of political and economic opening may 
have for the timing of regime change and the political profile of newly 
inaugurated democracies.1 For example, if economic liberalization leads 
to more rapid growth, an authoritarian regime may bolster its perfor-
1See, for example, Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 332-^ 11. This was also one of the central 
themes examined by the "Southern California Workshop on Political and Economic 
Liberalization," organized in 1992-1993 by the Center for International Studies, School of 
International Relations, University of Southern California. 
mance-based legitimacy sufficiently to prolong its hold on power/Exten-
sive market reform under authoritarian rule may strengthen the private 
sector's control over important economic activities and increase the 
political leverage of international and domestic business groups tied to 
the export sector^At the same time, reductions in public-sector employ-
ment and changes in industrial relations can undercut the mobilizational 
capacity and negotiating strength of labor unionsj Other aspects of" 
economic restructuring may have similarly negative consequences for 
the bargaining leverage of other mass organizations. Over the longer 
term; market reforms may gradually promote the development of a more 
densely textured civil society in which autonomously organized interest 
groups mobilize to demand increased opportunities for political repre-
sentation and greater accountability on the part of state authorities. But 
in the short run, economic liberalization under authoritarian rule may 
lead to shifts in the relative power exercised by different social actors that 
substantially reduce popular groups' ability to redress accumulated 
socioeconomic needs or influence national policy debates.\ 
/ Conversely, democratization before economic opening may signifi-
cantly delay or limit the extent of market reforms. The transition from 
authoritarian rule can lead to increased mobilization by popular-sector 
organizations. It may also heighten their influence over policy making 
by permitting mass-based parties to gain control over key decision-
making agencies or by strengthening their capacity to block policy 
initiatives that reduce the size of the public sector, eliminate consump-
tion subsidies, and so forth. For these reasons, the prior consolidation of 
more democratic governance can limit the extent of privatization, market 
deregulation, and trade liberalization. Democratic governments may 
well lack the ability to implement unpopular but necessary economic 
reforms. Over time, their failure to resolve pressing economic problems 
may weaken their own ability to govern.2 
/Whether the sequencing of political opening and market reform has 
lasting consequences is a particularly compelling question in Mexico, 
where since the mid-1980s the scope and speed of economic transforma-
tion have considerably exceeded the extent and pace of political liberaliz-
ation. 3Un economic matters, the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid 
Hurtacio (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) imple-
mented stabilization and structural adjustment policies designed to 
control inflation by limiting wage increases and reducing government 
2For a careful consideration of the relationship between economic crisis and electoral 
instability in Latin America in the 1980s, see Remmer 1991. 
3Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 336-38) view Mexico as a case of simultaneous economic 
and political liberalization, although they note the difficulty of maintaining "the intended 
balance between political and economic reforms" (p. 337). For other views on the relation-
ship between political liberalization and economic opening in Mexico, see Smith 1992; 
Roett 1993: 7, 11-12. 
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budgetary deficits. They also closed or privatized many state-owned 
enterprises, - liberalized terms for foreign private investment, and 
sharply reduced tariff and nontariff barriers to imports. Export promo-
tion replaced import substitution as the country's principal economic 
development strategy. Disciplined economic management and the re-
scheduling of Mexico's large foreign debt produced modest rates of 
growth after 1989, a considerable achievement given the severity of 
Mexico's post-1982 economic crisis. These macroeconomic gains came, 
however, at a very high social cost: per capita real disposable income fell 
throughout much of the 1980s, and although productivity increased, 
most workers' real wages were substantially lower in 1992 than a decade 
earlier.4 Yet over time, political parties representing ideological positions 
across the political spectrum and a substantial proportion of the general 
public came to support economic reform. The inauguration in January 
1994 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States marked the high point of this 
process. 
Despite significant political changes, the liberalization of Mexico's 
authoritarian regime proceeded much more slowly than economic re-
structuring. Legislation enacted between 1977 and 1993 permitted oppo-
sition parties to play a more prominent role in national politics, and 
elections (particularly at the state and local levels) became much more 
competitive. The growing importance of human rights groups, commu-
nity-based popular movements, and pro-democracy organizations also 
created a new dynamism in civil society. Even more notable, the 
unprecedented support mobilized by a leftist opposition coalition in the 
1988 presidential election demonstrated that victory by the ruling Insti-
tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was no longer inevitable.5 This impor-
tant shift in political perceptions was reinforced when the center-right 
National Action Party (PAN) broke the ruling party's long-standing 
monopoly on state governorships by winning the 1989 gubernatorial 
election in Baja California. The PAN later won control over the state 
governments in Chihuahua and Guanajuato as well. 
Yet overall, Mexico's governing political elite retained tight control 
over the pace and scope of political liberalization during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.6 The institutionalized power of the presidency, the effective-
ness of state controls over such mass actors as workers and peasants, and 
4For data on real wage and consumption trends during the 1980s and early 1990s, see 
Lustig 1992: tables 3.2, 3.4; Ros, this volume: table 3.1. 
5The coalition's candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, officially won 31.1 percent of the 
valid votes cast in the presidential election. The PRI's share fell to a new low of 50.7 percent. 
6President Salinas explicitly agreed that economic liberalization should precede democ-
ratization. He maintained that simultaneous political and economic opening (as in the 
former Soviet Union) risked undermining market reforms (New Perspectives Quarterly 8:1 
[Winter 1991]: 8). 
the continued organizational weakness of the political opposition were 
key factors in this regard. In addition, the combination of Salinas's 
forceful leadership, improved economic prospects (especially the effec-
tive control of inflation), and the popularity of the National Solidarity 
Program (PRONASOL)7 permitted the PRI to win major victories in the 
1991 midterm elections. The PRI's renewed electoral strength and the 
political momentum gained from final approval of the NAFTA permitted 
Salinas to impose his self-designated successor (Luis Donaldo Colosio 
Murrieta, minister of social development at the time of his nomination in 
late November 1993) as the PRI's 1994 presidential candidate.8 Indeed, 
some observers concluded that Salinas's capacity to select his successor 
in a closed process that is the linchpin of Mexican authoritarianism 
indicated that significant democratization had once again been post-
poned, perhaps until the next presidential succession in the year 2000. 
However, the January 1994 revolt by the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) in the southern state of Chiapas and the assassination 
of Colosio in March 1994 sharply altered political expectations. The 
Chiapas uprising dramatically called attention to the negative social 
consequences of neoliberal economic reform (especiallyT5rTndigenous 
peoples) and squarely focused national and mternalI6naTlrtterrtion on 
the question of democracy in Mexico.9 The Colosio assassination threw 
the PRI onto the defensive as a remarkably open struggle raged between 
Salinas's allies and party traditionalists over the selection of a successor 
candidate. Together these events created a greater degree of uncertainty 
within the governing political elite than at any time since Mexico's 
"official" party was founded in 1929. 
Whether these startling events and the 1994 general elections mark 
the beginning of regime transition in Mexico remains to be seen. Yet if 
piecemeal liberalization of Mexico's party system and electoral rules 
finally gives way to a more open-ended process of democratization, it 
will be due in considerable measure to the growing disunity of Mexico's 
7PRONASOL was a large-scale poverty alleviation program founded by President 
Salinas in December 1988 with proceeds from the sale of state-owned firms. For a careful 
evaluation of the program and its political and socioeconomic impact, see Cornelius, Craig, 
and Fox 1994a. 
8In late 1993 Salinas judged the PRI's position sufficiently strong to permit him to 
implement a new round of political reform in order to increase the legitimacy of electoral 
outcomes. This legislation increased the size of the federal Senate and guaranteed that 
opposition parties would control at least one-quarter of its seats; eliminated the "gover-
nability clause" enacted in 1986 (which ensured the PRI majority representation in the 
federal Chamber of Deputies even if it failed to win a similar share of the national vote); 
placed overall limits on campaign spending and loosely regulated private campaign 
financing; reduced somewhat the government's control over electoral authorities; and 
permitted independent verification of voter registration procedures and national election 
observers. For details, see Zaldivar Lelo de Larrea 1993; New York Times, September 14, 
1993, p. A4, September 19,1993, p. 11. 
9The electoral reforms adopted in the wake of the Chiapas rebellion are' summarized in 
the second part of this chapter. 
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postrevolutionary governing coalition and significant shifts in the bal-
ance of state-society relations—changes that in many (though not all) 
instances occurred as either the direct or indirect consequence of 
economic crisis and restructuring during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
These developments also potentially have important consequences for 
the kind of new regime that might eventually take shape in Mexico. 
This book analyzes the relationship between political and economic 
liberalization and the prospects for regime change in Mexico, focusing 
particularly on the period from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. 
Evaluating the extent and character of political change under continued 
authoritarian rule is never easy. This challenge is particularly acute in 
the case of Mexico, whose durable authoritarian regime differs in major 
ways from the highly repressive, exclusionary, military-dominated re-
gimes that came to power in a number of Latin American countries in the 
1960s and 1970s. Such elements as the formal guarantee of liberal 
political rights in a civilian-ruled system, regular elections and the 
presence of legally recognized opposition parties, the heterogeneity of 
Mexico's governing political elite, a reliable system of office rotation 
(including a constitutional prohibition against presidential reelection), 
and a comparatively low level of repression all contribute to the relative 
openness of the Mexican regime. Even in the wake of the Chiapas 
uprising and the Colosio assassination, these features—and the Mexican 
regime's renowned resilience in the face of pressures for political 
change—make it difficult to determine whether a particular set of 
electoral reforms marks the beginning of democratization or simply 
another round of limited concessions to opposition forces, modifications 
that reduce strain within the regime but leave the governing elite's 
authority essentially intact. 
The most promising analytical approach to this problem—and the ' 
perspective that informs many of the contributions to this volume—is to 
focus on the shifts in state-society relations that have occurred in the 
context of economic restructuring and the redefinition of Mexico's long-
term development strategy. The post-1982 economic crisis and the 
ongoing process of economic restructuring eroded the regime's tradi-
tional bases of support and threatened the interests of key social actors. 
The Salinas administration in particular marked an important transition 
in that it both implemented major economic changes and oversaw the 
initial transformation of the political coalition that had long supported 
postrevolutionary authoritarian rule. The principal objective of this 
book is to examine both the pressures that gave rise to these coalitional 
changes and their political implications. Several of the essays commis-
sioned for this volume do so by evaluating developments affecting 
political parties and major social actors (organized labor, the private 
sector, rural organizations, and urban popular movements). 
Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar Horcasitas 
The principal advantage of an actor-centered approach to the study 
of political change in an established authoritarian regime is that it 
permits a disaggregated examination of the intersection between eco-
nomic and political opening, without assuming that democratization is 
necessarily the outcome. It is especially important not to make such an 
assumption in the case of contemporary Mexico because the implica-
tions of recent shifts in state-society relations do not all point in the same 
direction for all sectors. For example, during the Salinas administration a 
generally more open relationship between state elites and urban popular 
movements contrasted with the more closed political environment for 
labor unions; the government tolerated a greater degree of electoral 
competitiveness while at the same time resorting more frequently to 
repression against leftist opponents; state officials established ties with a 
broader range of politically independent social actors but had limited 
tolerance for militant political activity. 
What emerges from the analyses in this volume, then, is not a 
predictive account of the direction of political change in Mexico. Rather, 
contributors portray a conflictive, often quite contradictory, process in 
which the complex factors that link economic and political liberalization 
begin to emerge. Although most of these chapters were written before 
the Zapatista uprising, the Colosio assassination, and the intense spec-
ulation that these events produced concerning the immediate prospects 
for democratization in Mexico, their assessment of the ways in which 
economic restructuring reconfigured the national political environment 
during the 1980s and early 1990s establishes a basis for evaluating future 
political developments in Mexico. 
This introductory chapter addresses three topics. The first section 
examines the historical origins of Mexico's postrevolutionary authori-
tarian regime, focusing on the principal institutional and coalitional 
legacies of regime formation in the aftermath of the 1910-1920 Mexican 
Revolution. It also addresses briefly the relationship between authori-
tarian rule and import-substituting industrialization from the 1940s 
through the 1970s, as well as the challenges posed by economic crisis in 
the 1980s. The second part of this chapter analyzes in greater detail the 
impact of economic crisis and restructuring on the stability of Mexico's 
governing coalition and the growing importance of opposition parties 
and electoral competition in the 1980s and early 1990s. The third section 
examines the ways in which economic restructuring and key political 
developments altered established patterns of state-society relations. 
This chapter concludes'by considering the implications of these develop-
ments for democratization. The conclusion also asks whether the re-
maining obstacles to regime change can be solved incrementally, or 
whether the transition to democracy in Mexico will necessarily involve a 
sharp break from past political practices. 
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POSTREVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Despite the passage of time and significant transformations, major 
aspects of Mexican politics in the 1980s and early 1990s still reflected the 
regime's revolutionary origins. By examining the institutional charac-
teristics and coalitional bases of authoritarian rule, this section estab-
lishes a historical baseline for evaluating contemporary political change. 
It also discusses briefly the post-1982 economic crisis, the consequences 
of neoliberal economic reforms for Mexico's future growth prospects, 
and the implications of these economic developments for regime legit-
imacy. 
FORGING MEXICO'S POSTREVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
Mexico's 1910-1920 social revolution redrew the political landscape. The 
overthrow of Porfirio Diaz's personalistic authoritarian regime (the 
Porfiriato, 1876-1911) initiated a protracted, violent struggle for political 
power among rival factions with different capabilities and disparate, 
often conflicting goals. Some elements sought only a limited political 
reform of the old order, while others pursued a broad transformation of 
social structures and class relations. Military confrontation and serious 
factional rivalry persisted until the late 1920s. However, the last success-
ful military revolt occurred in 1920 and brought to the fore a "north-
western coalition" led by Alvaro Obregon, a principal military leader of 
the "Constitutionalist" forces after 1913 and the dominant figure in 
national politics between his election as president in 1920 and his 
assassination in 1928. The new postrevolutionary elite was bent on the 
expansion and centralization of political power, both to effect socio-
economic change and to defend the revolution against domestic and 
foreign threats. 
Peasants' and workers' entry into national politics during the revolu-
tion was a major departure in Mexican history. The rapid expansion of 
political consciousness among mass actors and their mobilization be-
hind a program of far-reaching socioeconomic and political reform 
helped bring about significant change. For example, revolutionary 
mobilization undercut the political power of the landowning class and 
eroded foreign control over natural resource industries. Explicit recogni-
tion of unions as legitimate bargaining agents in the workplace, constitu-
tional protection of the right to strike, and creation of state administra-
tive agencies to mediate conflicts also reshaped worker-employer 
relations. More generally, by creating new opportunities for the competi-
tive mobilization of support, the presence of peasants and workers in the 
political arena redefined the character of elite-mass interactions. 
Mass mobilization also influenced the content of the distinctive body 
of political beliefs that was associated with the revolutionary experience. 
10 Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar Horcasitas 
These beliefs combined liberal conceptions of individual rights and 
constitutional rule, nationalism, and a broad programmatic commit-
ment to economic redistribution and social justice. Liberal ideas of 
constitutionalism, federalism and municipal autonomy (municipio libre), 
and private property particularly informed debate about political and 
socioeconomic change during the early phases of the revolutionary 
struggle (Cordova 1973:16, 18, 21, 27). However, the armed peasantry's 
demand for large-scale land distribution and the growing political and 
economic importance of organized labor in urban areas made commit-
ment to extensive social reform an essential element in revolutionary 
political discourse. The 1917 federal Constitution, for example, included 
separate articles providing for land reform (Article 27) and workers' legal 
and social protection (Article 123). These articles were especially signifi-
cant because they emphasized the collective character of new social and 
political rights for peasants and workers, not just opportunities for 
individual advancement. The fusion of nationalism and a commitment 
to social reform in "revolutionary nationalism" provided a particularly 
compelling focus for popular identification with the postrevolutionary 
order. 
Two pillars supported the postrevolutionary authoritarian regime 
that took shape during the 1920s and 1930s: a strong, increasingly 
centralized, and interventionist state, and a hegemonic "party of the 
revolution" closely linked to the state apparatus.10 Elite commitment to 
maintaining political control and promoting socioeconomic change 
made state structures centrally important in postrevolutionary Mexico. 
Such measures as land reform and the regulation or nationalization of 
foreign-owned properties required a strong state. Similarly, the govern-
ing party provided an institutional framework for mediating elite com-
petition, limiting conflict, and mobilizing mass support during elec-
tions. 
Centralized political power and active state intervention in socio-
economic affairs became hallmarks of the new, postrevolutionary order. 
The 1917 federal Constitution divided decision-making responsibility 
among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and it created a 
federal system in which states' rights and municipal autonomy were 
explicitly recognized. Both the formal structure of government and the 
guarantee of individual rights reflected the influence of liberal political 
ideas. Nevertheless, in the belief that strong executive leadership was 
necessary to guarantee the implementation of social reforms won during 
the revolution and to ensure the political stability required for national 
economic development, delegates to the 1916-1917 Constitutional Con-
10For an analysis of the distinctive characteristics of postrevolutionary authoritarian 
rule and an examination of the Mexican case, see Middlebrook n.d.: chap. 1. Parts of this 
section are drawn from Middlebrook. 
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vention placed preeminent authority in the presidency and limited the 
powers of the legislative and judicial branches. 
The 1917 Constitution thus laid the legal foundation for postrevolu-
tionary governments' relative decision-making autonomy. Presidents 
Alvaro Obregon (1920-1924) and Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) acted 
forcefully to subordinate the armed forces to civilian authority and to 
establish political control over regional bosses (caciques) whose power 
had grown significantly during a decade of armed conflict. At the same 
time, Obregon and Calles created the administrative bases for active 
state economic intervention. The northwesterners who came to power 
under Obregon's leadership envisioned a political economy in which a 
vigorous domestic private sector would contribute actively to the devel-
opment of national industry, thus reducing the influence of foreign 
(especially U.S.) capital. However, because of the manifest weakness of 
the national private sector, the absence of domestic financial institutions 
or a capital market, and the lack of adequate infrastructure, they 
understood that the state would necessarily play a leading role in 
economic development. By the late 1920s, the Obregon and Calles 
administrations had created a network of financial and regulatory 
institutions11 and initiated a series of major infrastructure projects 
(especially roads, dams, and irrigation systems) that underpinned 
subsequent agricultural modernization and industrial development. 
The formation of an "official" party in 1929 accelerated the trend 
toward the centralization of national political power. A number of small, 
often regionaEy based political parties formed during and after the 
revolution. Competition among parties with narrow social bases con-
tributed to factional rivalries which culminated in Obregon's assassina-
tion in July 1928, shortly after he won reelection to the presidency. The 
death of the early postrevolutionary period's most important political 
figure threatened to throw the country into chaos over the question of 
presidential succession. Calles addressed this problem by renouncing 
any intention to seek a second presidential term, and in March 1929 he 
organized the Revolutionary National Party (PNR) to contain factional 
rivalries. He perceived the creation of a national "party of the revolution" 
to be an essential basis for ensuring the political stability necessary for 
economic development.12 
The creation of the PNR was a significant step in the institutionaliza-
tion of postrevolutionary Mexican politics. The PNR and its successors, 
the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM, 1938) and the PRI (1946), 
offered an organizational framework for the reconciliation of competing 
1
' These included a central bank (the Banco de Mexico) and national highway, irrigation, 
electrical power generation, agricultural credit, and banking commissions. 
12The definitive study of political parties during and after the revolution and the 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the PNR is Garrido 1982, especially chaps. 1, 
political interests. For much of the period between 1929 and the 1980s, 
the "party of the revolution" grouped a heterogeneous collection of 
sociopolitical actors which, despite considerable internal competition 
and frequent conflict over policy goals, was linked by an overarching 
consensus on broad norms of political action and the general goals of 
economic development.13 The very heterogeneity of this governing 
"revolutionary coalition" symbolized the established regime's commit-
ment to the political representation of diverse interests. 
Equally important, the governing party served as a major vehicle for 
regime legitimation through its dominance of the electoral process. The 
postrevolutionary elite's control over the state apparatus gradually per-
mitted the "official" party to establish its electoral hegemony, though 
resistance from regional and local political bosses made this a slow, 
uneven process. Where ample access to government personnel and 
financial resources proved insufficient to secure victory for the party, 
fraudulent electoral practices were authorized or tolerated by govern-
ment officials to secure the desired result. Indeed, from 1929 until 1988 
the "official" party's candidates never lost an election for the presidency, 
the federal Senate, or state governorships. The party's close ties to the 
federal executive after the mid-1930s and its dominance in national 
electoral politics during subsequent decades substantially strengthened 
presidential control over the federal legislature and state governments. 
Moreover, the party's control over elected government positions contrib-
uted significantly to the emergence of a cohesive clase politica drawn 
predominantly from the urban middle class, socialized by shared educa-
tional experiences, frequently linked by kinship ties, and distinct in 
background and experience from the national bourgeoisie.14 
The party was able to fulfill such diverse functions because, at least 
until the late 1980s, it was closely identified with revolutionary national-
ism—the political goals and social program of the Mexican Revolution. 
(Its colors are those of the Mexican flag: red, white, and green.) 
Opposition parties existed on both the left and right. The "party of the 
revolution," however, occupied the broad center of national political life, 
defining the essential dichotomy of postrevolutionary politics: its sup-
porters were those committed to the realization of the revolution's 
diverse goals, while those who opposed it were necessarily "counter-
revolutionary."15 
,3Among these were such crucial issues as the public sector's role in economic 
development, the need to provide competing political factions with regularized access to 
administrative and elective office, and the importance of opening channels of social and 
economic advancement to lower-class groups. 
14The best analyses of Mexico's political elite are Smith 1979 and Camp 1980. For an 
examination of changes in elite composition and behavior, see Middlebrook 1988:122-34. 
15Calles made this distinction explicit in December 1928 when organizing support for 
the party. See Dulles 1961: 410. 
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A strong, interventionist state and a hegemonic party were crucial to 
forging (and preserving) a durable alliance between the ruling political 
elite and mass social forces. On the one hand, reliable control over the 
principal instruments of coercion allowed governing elites to repress 
challenges from popular forces, and the construction of a state adminis-
trative apparatus with the institutional capacity to mediate mass partici-
pation permitted successive presidential administrations to establish the 
de jure and de facto parameters of sociopolitical organization and 
mobilization. Yet at the same time, the Mexican state's far-reaching 
intervention in socioeconomic affairs provided government decision 
makers with the means to formulate development policies that re-
sponded to key peasant and labor demands. An extensive program of 
land distribution in the 1930s and the creation of elaborate credit and 
marketing arrangements to subsidize small-scale agricultural produc- ^ ^ 
tion transformed peasant communities into a reliable source of electoral / 
support for the "official" party. Urban and industrial workers benefited^) 
from such measures as enterprise profit-sharing and a broad range of 
publicly financed social welfare programs, including subsidized access 
to basic commodities, health care, housing, and consumer credit. In 
general, these were socioeconomic benefits that peasant and worker 
organizations would have been hard pressed to win on their own. 
Securing them depended fundamentally on mass organizations' politi-
cal alliance with state elites. 
Similarly, the political dominance exercised by the governing party -^ -j 
helped cement mass actors' loyalty to the regime. The "party of the ~> 
revolution" was the principal channel of political mobility for the leaders 
of lower-class organizations.16 Peasant and labor leaders' presence in 
important elective positions gave mass organizations a share (however •, 
modest) of political power, opening up opportunities to use their 
numerical importance in national politics both to influence government 
policy decisions and to defend past gains. More generally, peasant and 
labor organizations' affiliation with the governing party symbolized 
their inclusion in the postrevolutionary governing coalition. This is why . 
the organized labor movement in particular vigorously resisted attempts 
by different presidential administrations to reduce the formal role of , 
mass organizations in party affairs. 
The governing elite's effective control over mass demands estab-
lished the political foundations for rapid economic growth. Beginning in / <<<; 
the early 1940s, Mexican decision makers embraced import-substituting '•> _^_ 
industrialization as their principal development strategy. Pursuit of this/ 
approach, whose goal was to supply national demand with domestically 
. manufactured consumer durable goods and intermediate products 
16Beginning in 1938 the "official" party was organized on the basis of labor, agrarian, 
military, and "popular" sectors. The military sector was formally eliminated in 1943. 
_ rather than with foreign imports, led successive presidential administra-
tions to enact new policies to promote domestic industry. These included 
<-• higher tariff barriers, direct import controls, and tighter government 
restrictions on foreign direct investment. Unlike their counterparts in 
/ Argentina and Brazil, Mexican policy makers had by the late 1950s 
J
 realized their double goals of producing steady economic expansion and 
rising per capita income while at the same time controlling inflation (a 
I period that was, therefore, often referred to as "stabilizing develop-
/ ment"). 
Economic success both strengthened postrevolutionary govern-
ments' performance-based claim to the legitimate exercise of authority 
and reinforced the elite-mass alliances that underpinned authoritarian 
rule. Many analysts subsequently noted that, over the longer term, the 
import-substitution policies adopted in the early 1940s created a number 
of problems which contributed to serious economic difficulties in the 
1970s and 1980s (Thorp 1992; Hirschman 1968).17 Moreover, the period of 
growth often characterized as the "Mexican miracle" contributed to 
greater economic and social inequality.18 Yet from the 1940s through the 
1970s, the strategy of import-substituting industrialization enjoyed 
r
 broad support within Mexico's governing coalition. Economic growth 
; produced new sources of employment, and especially after the 
mid-1950s, rising real wages and expanding social welfare benefits 
< significantly improved many workers' standard of living. The ability of 
labor and peasant leaders to deliver substantial resources to their 
members strengthened their position within government-allied mass 
organizations, thereby reinforcing the elite-mass alliances so crucial to 
regime stability. 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 1980s: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND 
NEOLIBERAL REFORM 
Mexico's post-1982 economic crisis posed serious potential risks to the 
established political and social order, and it forced government decision 
makers to undertake a process of economic restructuring that had 
lasting political consequences. The proximate source of financial diffi-
culty lay in heavy borrowing from international creditors during the 
1970s and early 1980s. Foreign borrowing contributed to rapid growth 
during Mexico's petroleum-led economic boom in 1978-1981,19 but the 
17These problems included excessive dependence on imports of intermediate and 
capital goods, overvalued exchange rates and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties, 
inefficient domestic industries producing high-cost consumer products for a heavily 
protected domestic market, and a very limited capacity to export manufactured goods. 
18Mexico's gross domestic product rose by an annual average of 6.5 percent in real terms 
between 1941 and 1981. Calculated from data presented in INEGI1985: vol. 1, table 9.1. 
19Gross domestic product grew by an average of 8.4 percent per year in real terms in 
these years. Calculated from data presented in INEGI 1985: vol. 1, table 9.1. 
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level of public- and private-sector indebtedness was not sustainable. As 
Victor L. Urquidi notes (this volume), excessive debt payment obliga-
tions coupled With declining petroleum prices in 1981-1982 produced 
growing economic instability. Escalating short-term debt service obliga-
tions, increasing capital flight, large-scale devaluations, and worsening 
balance-of-payments problems finally led to a liquidity crisis in August 
1982 which detonated the Latin American debt crisis. 
In response, the newly inaugurated de la Madrid administration 
adopted an orthodox economic stabilization plan that sharply limited 
wage increases, cut government social spending, and reduced or elimi-
nated a broad range of government consumption subsidies. The govern-
ment also attempted in 1983 and 1984 to reschedule the country's foreign 
debt. But as Urquidi indicates, debt service payments remained very 
high. Economic recovery was further constrained by unstable prices for 
Mexico's petroleum exports, low levels of domestic and foreign invest-
ment, and insufficient access to foreign credit. Despite high interest 
rates, the inflation rate averaged 88 percent per year between 1982 and 
1988 (and reached an annual rate of 177 percent in January 1988). 
Economic policy makers managed to bring inflation under control 
only by negotiating the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) with business, 
labor, and peasant representatives in December 1987. Jaime Ros (this 
volume) concludes that several singular advantages—economic policy 
makers' relative dedsion-making autonomy in a strongly presidentialist 
system, Mexico's geostrategic importance for the United States (which 
led the U.S. government to view the country as an essential "test case" 
for its debt restructuring initiatives in the mid- and late 1980s), the 
historically low degree of indexation in the wage/price system, and the 
remarkable flexibility that Mexico's system of state-labor relations gave 
economic policy makers in setting wages—permitted structural adjust-
ment to proceed much more rapidly and smoothly in Mexico than in a 
number of other Latin American countries. Nevertheless, the economy 
grew by less than 0.1 percent per year in real terms between 1982 and 
1988.20 
The depth and length of the economic crisis compelled government 
officials to reexamine the role of the public sector and the country's 
overall strategy for economic development. Beginning in 1985-1987, 
economic policy makers radically liberalized Mexico's trade and indus-
trial policy regime, rapidly privatized state-owned enterprises, and 
aggressively deregulated foreign investment flows and domestic eco-
nomic activities. To explain why this occurred, Ros presents a "political 
economy model" of market reforms that emphasizes the interaction 
among the willingness of policy makers to adopt market reforms, 
foreign lenders' willingness to support these measures by increasing the 
20Cakulated from data presented in Lustig 1992: table 2.4. 
flow of capital to the reforming country, the cost of not obtaining 
external finance, the policy trade-offs between stabilization and struc-
tural reform, and the extent of domestic opposition to market reforms. 
Because attracting foreign capital was vitally important, Mexican 
decision makers had strong incentives to adopt market reforms. Indeed, 
the U.S. government's Baker (1985) and Brady (1989) plans conditioned 
additional foreign lending on debtor countries' willingness to adopt 
such measures. The result was a sharp shift toward export-oriented 
economic development, greater scope for market forces, and a more 
prominent role for the private sector in promoting economic growth. 
These policies were accompanied by other measures (including the 
elimination of government budget deficits, more effective tax collection, 
and greater institutional autonomy for the Banco de Mexico) designed to 
maintain business confidence and place the Mexican economy on the 
path toward sustained long-term growth. 
The political implications of economic restructuring are examined in 
detail in the following two sections. It is important to note, however, that 
these neoliberal reforms may constitute an ambiguous economic legacy 
for Mexico. Both Urquidi and Ros (this volume) observe that, despite 
important gains in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of unre-
solved problems may constrain future economic growth. These include 
decidedly mixed productivity growth in the manufacturing sector; a low 
private savings rate; inadequate levels of public investment; the pressing 
need to use additional public resources to resolve serious, accumulated 
social needs; and the economy's limited ability to generate sufficient 
levels of employment, especially unskilled jobs.21 Moreover, the Mexi-
can economy remains heavily dependent on the continued massive 
inflow of foreign capital, which may not continue at the levels reached 
during the period before the approval of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. 
ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
The economic crisis of the 1980s and the shift in national development 
strategy had important political consequences for Mexico's postrevolu-
tionary authoritarian regime. Prolonged economic stagnation seriously 
eroded the regime's performance-based claims to political legitimacy. 
Conflicts arising over the direction of economic policy aggravated ten-
sions within the governing political elite, leading to factional splits that 
strengthened the position of opposition parties. Moreover, public con-
cerns regarding management of the economy, corruption in govern-
ment, and electoral fraud badly tarnished the prestige of the presidency. 
21
 In his contribution to this volume, Francisco Valdes Ugalde also asks whether the 
private sector's greatly increased influence in Mexican politics is compatible with an 
efficient allocation of resources among national priorities. 
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Accumulated socioeconomic discontent and growing demands for de-
mocracy produced in 1988 an unprecedented challenge to the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party's electoral hegemony. This section examines 
the factors that have contributed to the heightened importance of 
opposition parties in Mexican politics and increased electoral compet-
itiveness since the early 1980s. 
PRESIDENTIALISM, ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, AND COALITION 
CHANGE 
Many analysts would argue that a broad program of economic restruc-
turing could be implemented more easily in Mexico's highly centralized 
authoritarian regime than under a democratic government or in an 
authoritarian regime with a weaker executive. From this perspective, 
the combination of a strong presidency and a hegemonic party was 
especially well suited to pushing through controversial market reforms 
because in Mexico the federal executive commands overwhelming politi-
cal power. This interpretation of Mexican politics stresses that the 
strength of the PRI and the weakness of the political opposition are both 
products of a strong presidency (Hansen 1971; Purcell 1975; Carpizo 
1985; Garrido 1987; Cornelius and Craig 1988; Aguilar Camin and Meyer 
1993). 
A less orthodox interpretation of Mexican presidencialismo holds that 
the federal executive's power depends on unified partisan control of both 
chambers of Congress, the president's ability to discipline the "official" 
party, and continued PRI dominance over the political opposition. Yet 
there are significant tensions among these different conditions. For 
example, the president's capacity to lead and control the PRI depends 
upon his ability to satisfy the party's diverse constituencies. Thus, if the 
coalition of interests grouped in the ruling party is too large, the 
president may face contradictory, ultimately irreconcilable demands. 
The president may find it especially difficult during bad economic times 
to maintain a broad governing coalition. From this perspective, the 
president might under such conditions seek to reduce the PRI coalition 
to a more manageable size and reorganize it consistent with his own 
policy preferences. At the same time, however, the president also faces 
strong pressures to enlarge and diversify the PRI coalition in order to 
deprive opposition parties of mass support. The tension between policy 
incentives to reduce the heterogeneity of the PRI coalition and political 
pressures to enlarge it is particularly intense during difficult economic 
times (Scott 1959; Vernon 1963; Story 1986; Philip 1992; Molinar Hor-
casitas 1994). 
These alternative interpretations illuminate both the sources of 
policy instability in Mexico during much of the 1970s and early 1980s and 
the reasons why accelerated economic restructuring after the mid-1980s 
exacerbated factional division within the governing coalition. Political 
struggles over national economic policy began in the early 1970s when 
problems associated with import-substituting industrialization began to 
mount. Rising inflation, faltering economic growth, and growing bal-
ance-of-payments problems sparked an enduring "dispute for the na-
tion" (Cordera and Tello 1981) that pitted "nationalists" against "neo-
liberals." The former advocated policies that would "deepen" the process 
of import-substituting industrialization, including increased public in-
vestment and measures that would stimulate domestic demand. In 
contrast, the neoliberals proposed policies to control inflation, dismantle 
protectionism, and increase Mexico's long-term economic competitive-
ness and export potential (Soli's 1985; Villarreal 1976; Ortiz Mena 1980). 
Both policy agendas included several initiatives that promised to be 
politically costly, and the Echeverria (1970-1976) and Lopez Portillo 
(1976-1982) governments' efforts to avoid splintering the PRI coalition 
explain in large part the policy zigzags associated with their administra-
tions. Indeed, the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo presidencies ended in 
economic and political crises that contrasted sharply with the much 
more orderly presidential successions that occurred in 1958, 1964, and 
1970 during the period of stabilizing development. 
Under the pressures of prolonged economic crisis and the urgent 
need to secure long-term access to capital, the de la Madrid and Salinas 
administrations broke this policy deadlock in favor of neoliberal eco-
nomic restructuring. This shift had important political implications. 
Among other things, adoption of an export-oriented development model 
increased the political significance and policy leverage of the private 
sector. 
Salinas signaled this departure in a campaign speech that he 
delivered in Garza Garcia, Nuevo Leon (a suburb of Monterrey, the 
home of Mexico's most important industrialists), in May 1988: "The 
engines of sustained economic growth in future years will be private 
investment, nonpetroleum exports, public investment in infrastructure, 
and the expansion of the domestic market" (La Jornada, May 20, 1988). 
Salinas made it clear that this ordering was not coincidental; domestic 
and foreign private investment would take clear precedence over public 
investment, which would be restricted to infrastructure projects. More-
over, nonpetroleum exports would receive priority over the expansion of 
domestic consumer demand. This position stood in sharp contrast to 
postrevolutionary governments' traditional nationalist commitments to 
economic protectionism and tight regulation of foreign investment, a 
"mixed" economy in which the state played a key role in the production 
of goods and services, and an inward-oriented development strategy in 
which the capacity for economic expansion depended heavily on in-
creased domestic demand. 
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Nevertheless, as Francisco Valdes Ugalde observes (this volume), the 
recovery of business confidence and the consolidation of an alliance 
between neoliberal reformers and the private sector required consider-
able time. Memory of the 1982 bank nationalization was the principal 
obstacle. Even though the de la Madrid administration took several 
steps to heal this rift (including constitutional reforms enacted in 1982 to 
clarify the state's role in economic affairs and limit state ownership to 
specified, strategic areas), many entrepreneurs feared a resurgence of 
"populism." In the course of their struggle to win a durable government 
commitment to a more favorable state-private-sector relationship, busi-
ness organizations gained new confidence concerning their involvement 
in partisan politics.22 What finally convinced them that neoliberal policy 
makers were serious about ceding significant space to the private sector 
was the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations' aggressive privatiza-
tion program (the symbolic high point of which was the reprivatization 
of banks and other financial institutions in 1990-1992), the decision to 
abrogate peasants' constitutional right (Article 27) to the redistribution 
of land and permit the private sale of collectively owned ejido lands, and 
the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
As Echevema and Lopez Portillo had feared, the government's 
decisive turn toward neoliberal economic policies and the private sector's 
more prominent political role split the PRI coalition. Two factors were 
particularly important in this regard. First, the groups most adversely 
affected by cuts in government subsidies and the privatization of state-
owned enterprises were organized workers and peasants, the PRI's most 
important base of mass support. The consistent pursuit of economic 
policies that produced declining real wages and lower per capita incomes 
during the 1980s threatened the PRI's long-standing claim to represent a 
multiclass coalition forged in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. 
In particular, resource constraints severely undermined the patron-
client ties and distributional alliances that were traditionally at the heart 
of the PRI (Dresser, this volume). 
Second, de la Madrid and Salinas named to prominent policy-
making positions political technocrats whose mentalities and ideologi-
cal preferences differed sharply from those of traditional PRI politi-
cians.23 Individuals rising to high national office in the 1980s and early 
1990s on the basis of their educational achievements and technical 
expertise were members of a generation far removed from the violent 
political and social upheaval that produced the Mexican regime. (The 
contrast was particularly marked in the case of the labor movement, 
which was still led in the early 1990s by individuals personally linked to 
^Dresser (this volume) notes that in the 1991 midterm elections 17 percent of the PRI's 
candidates came from the business sector. 
23The term political technocrat is used by Camp (1985). 
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the 1910-1920 revolutionary experience.) Control over key posts by 
young, often foreign-educated technocrats increased discontent within 
the political elite because traditional politicians (sometimes referred to 
as dirwsaurios) believed that their opportunities for mobility and policy 
influence were blocked. 
The ascent of this neoliberal faction faced stubborn resistance from 
nationalist sectors of the governing coalition. In 1986 some of these 
dissident elements formed the Democratic Current (CD) within the PRI, 
a movement calling for the democratization of the governing party's 
method of selecting presidential candidates and a more equitable model 
of economic development. Its most prominent supporters were Cuauh-
temoc Cardenas (son of former president Lazaro Cardenas and governor 
of Michoacan from 1980 to 1986) and Porfirio Munoz Ledo (a former PRI 
president who had held major cabinet positions during the Echeverria 
and Lopez Portillo administrations and who had also served as Mexico's 
representative to the United Nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
Although members of the Democratic Current repeatedly espoused 
their loyalty to the PRI and described their initiative as an example of 
disciplined criticism designed to promote internal party reform, the PRI 
hierarchy considered the group's activities a veiled attack on the de la 
Madrid administration and attempted to limit the movement's impact by 
threatening to expel its supporters from the party. When the PRI 
leadership prevented Cardenas from competing for the party's presiden-
tial nomination and de la Madrid selected Salinas as his successor 
(thereby signaling the continuation of de la Madrid's neoliberal program 
and the new dominance of a political faction centered in key economic 
policy-making centers, particularly the Banco de Mexico and the Minis-
try of Finance), Cardenas, Munoz Ledo, and other advocates of tradi-
tionally nationalist policy positions broke with the governing party. 
Their exit produced the most serious division within the Mexican 
political elite since the early 1950s.24 
The alienation of many traditional PRI supporters and the split in 
the governing elite contributed directly to the Institutional Revolution-
ary Party's electoral debacle in 1988. Opposition political parties— 
particularly the center-right National Action Party (PAN), but also 
leftist parties—had made major gains in municipal elections in 1983, 
and the PAN had strongly challenged the ruling party in several state 
elections in 1986.25 But in 1988 the principal challenge came from the 
left. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, leading a heterogeneous opposition coali-
tion called the National Democratic Front (FDN), officially received 31.1 
24In the 1952 elections, General Miguel Henriquez Guzman's Federation of People's 
Parties won 16 percent of the vote. This was the most serious challenge to the PRi's 
presidential candidate since the governing party's formation in 1929. 
^Indeed, the government was forced to resort to massive fraud to deny the PAN victory 
in the gubernatorial race in Chihuahua in 1986. 
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percent of the valid votes cast in the presidential election.26 Cardenas's 
very strong showing reflected his close personal identification with 
revolutionary nationalist policy positions,27 widespread discontent 
with government austerity measures and the de la Madrid administra-
tion's inadequate response to the housing and relocation problems 
caused by the 1985 Mexico City earthquakes, and growing public 
demands for democracy. Under the weight of these diverse pressures, 
the PRI's share of the presidential vote fell to a new low. Whether 
Salinas actually won a majority in a hotly contested election marred by 
extensive fraud remains a matter of considerable dispute. What is 
certain is that this outcome ended an era in which victory by the "party 
of the revolution" was accepted as a matter of course by actors across 
the political spectrum. 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 
The 1988 elections thus marked an important turning point in Mexican 
politics. The fact that popular discontent with government austerity 
measures and declining standards of living was expressed through 
electoral channels largely reflected the increased opportunities for politi-
cal contestation made possible by Lopez Portillo's 1977 political reform 
and subsequent changes in party registration requirements and elec-
toral procedures.28 Some analysts argue that the principal effect of these 
liberalizing measures was to preclude more complete democratization 
by directing pressures for political change into a seemingly endless 
series of party and electoral reforms that failed to modify the core 
elements of Mexican authoritarianism (Loaeza, this volume). Yet en-
hanced opportunities to constitute opposition parties, contest elections, 
and win a (still quite limited) share of power had important conse-
quences . The combination of intra-elite conflict over economic policy and 
access to decision-making positions, popular dissatisfaction with some 
of the consequences of market reforms, and regularly scheduled elec-
toral contests produced over time a much more competitive political 
environment, particularly at state and local levels. As a result, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, elections and party politics assumed unprece-
dented importance in Mexico. 
26The National Action Party officially received 16.8 percent of the presidential vote. 
27As president between 1934 and 1940, Cardenas's father implemented an extensive 
agrarian reform program and nationalized foreigrt-owned petroleum companies. 
28The L6pez Portillo administration implemented an important political reform mea-
sure in order to integrate recently formed opposition parties into the officially recognized 
party system, reinvigorate the PRI by increasing the effectiveness of party competition, 
and restore public confidence in the regime in the aftermath of such events as the 1968 
"Tlatelolco massacre," in which police and army troops killed or wounded hundreds of 
protesting students. For a discussion of the 1977 reform's origins and its consequences, see 
Middlebrook 1986. 
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The increased competitiveness of elections reflected important 
changes on both the left and right. On the left, Cardenas formed the 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1989 to institutionalize the 
opposition coalition he led in the 1988 elections. The PRD suffered from 
considerable factionalism as a result of both personal and ideological 
disputes among its principal leaders and Salinas administration officials' 
concerted efforts to co-opt and divide what they perceived to be their 
most serious political opponent. Because of conflicts over political 
strategy and because PRD organizers were frequently the targets of 
political violence, the party was only partially successful at forging ties 
with worker, peasant, and urban popular organizations. At the same 
time, the PRD's organizational weakness and government officials' 
resort to electoral fraud prevented the party from winning many impor-
tant electoral contests, even in such core areas of Cardenista support as 
the state of Michoacan. These problems led the PRD in the early 1990s to 
adopt increasingly radical, antisy stem positions on some issues, making 
collaboration with the National Action Party more difficult (Alcocer, this 
volume). Nevertheless, the PRD did make inroads into some of the PRI's 
traditional constituencies, and despite the many obstacles it faced, the 
PRD emerged as the most important opposition force positioned to the 
left of Mexico's ruling party. 
The National Action Party remained the most important force on the 
right. In 1989 the PAN broke the PRI's monopoly on state governorships 
by winning the gubernatorial election in Baja California. As noted 
above, PAN candidates later won control over the state governments of 
Chihuahua and Guanajuato as well. Such victories gave the party both 
significant practical experience in governing at the state and municipal 
levels and an important base for political organization.29 Somewhat 
paradoxically, the PAN also experienced considerable internal divisions 
as the Salinas administration adopted many of its traditional policy 
positions (including constitutional reforms limiting the extent of state 
economic intervention, permitting the sale and private ownership of 
ejido lands, and lifting the bans against the Roman Catholic Church's 
ownership of property and involvement in political affairs) and sought to 
form a loose political coalition with the PAN. Some PANistas viewed the 
Salinas government's offer of programmatic collaboration as little more 
than a sophisticated form of co-optation that undermined the party's 
capacity to push for democratization. Indeed, in 1992 conflict over this 
issue led several prominent PAN leaders to secede from the party.30 
Overall, however, the PAN benefited substantially from deepening 
29See Rodriguez and Ward 1994 for a careful examination of PAN government in Baja 
California. 
^The secessionists included Pablo Emilio Madero, grandson of Francisco Madero, who 
in 1910-1911 led the successful liberal challenge to Porfirio Diaz that initiated the Mexican 
Revolution. 
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public support for several of its principal policy positions, the financial 
assistance of some business organizations and the willingness of promi-
nent entrepreneurs to stand as PAN candidates, and the fact that the 
Salinas administration was much more willing to accept electoral victo-
ries by the PAN than by the PRD. 
Underlying these developments were important shifts in the parti-
san alignment of Mexican voters. Joseph L. Klesner (this volume) 
convincingly demonstrates how structural social change and the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1980s undermined the PRI's electoral position. For 
many decades, the PRI exercised unchallenged electoral hegemony in 
the Mexican countryside (a product of both peasant loyalty to the regime 
that introduced an extensive land reform in the 1930s and the political 
control exercised by PRI-allied caciques) and drew considerable support 
from unionized urban and industrial workers, public employees, and 
portions of the urban middle class. Over time, however, rural-to-urban 
migration eroded the PRI's most reliable base of electoral support, and 
the party's capacity to attract urban middle-class voters declined sharply 
after the early 1970s. Competition from the opposition parties that were 
officially registered following the 1977 political reform also reduced the 
PRI's traditionally overwhelming electoral majorities. 
Yet it was accumulated popular discontent with the government's 
post-1982 austerity and economic restructuring policies that produced 
unprecedented support for opposition parties in 1988. Klesner's analysis 
shows that leftist parties, for example, performed much better than in 
previous years among peasants and the urban poor. These parties 
increased their vote totals at the direct expense of the PRI. Klesner 
argues that these changes do not yet indicate electoral realignment—that 
is, the relatively stable reorganization within the electorate of the group 
basis of support for major political parties. However, partisan dealign-
ment is an established fact in contemporary Mexican politics. Klesner 
concludes that "the Mexican electorate is less securely under the PRI's 
control than it has ever been." 
The Salinas administration responded to these changing political 
realities in three principal ways. First, Salinas vigorously sought to 
restore the power and prestige of the presidency and build a new social 
coalition in support of his neoliberal program (see the following section). 
Second, he forged a de facto alliance with the National Action Party in 
order to split the political opposition and create a working congressional 
majority in support of key legislative initiatives. This alliance held 
considerable strategic value for the regime. In 1988, opposition parties 
had cooperated in an antisystem coalition formed around demands for 
democratization. Faced with government officials' continued resort to 
electoral fraud and other abuses of power, the principal opposition 
parties on the left and right set aside their ideological differences in order 
to cooperate against their common adversaries—the government and 
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the Institutional Revolutionary Party. However, interparty dynamics 
changed when the Salinas administration adopted ideological positions 
closer to those advocated by the PAN. The opposition front against the 
PRI began to break up when the PAN was courted by the PRI and when 
the PRD and the PAN took divergent positions concerning various 
political liberalization proposals, an issue that had united them in 1988 
(Alcocer, this volume). 
Third, Salinas sought to reform and revitalize the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party. Reform of the PRI—characterized by some ob-
servers as a "mission impossible" (Meyer 1989)—has long been the goal 
of those regime loyalists seeking both to preserve power and to increase 
the competitiveness and legitimacy of the party and electoral systems. 
Like its recent predecessors, the Salinas administration attempted to 
open up internal party decision-making procedures and improve the 
quality of PRI candidates (Dresser, this volume). More important, PRI 
reformers sought to restrict the role of sectoral organizations within the 
party and to adopt a territorial structure for an envisioned "party of 
citizens." They believed that, given the declining capacity of "official" 
labor and peasant organizations to mobilize their members in support of 
PRI candidates, a territorial structure would allow the party to respond 
more effectively to the concerns of an increasingly diverse, urban 
electorate. However, many of the Salinas administration's most impor-
tant party reform initiatives met strong opposition from PRI traditional-
ists. Aggressive lobbying by the Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(CTM) successfully blocked key organizational reforms. As a result, the 
PRI remained organized around a combination of sectoral and territorial 
bodies.31 
Despite such setbacks, Salinas's various political initiatives won him 
widespread personal popularity, restored the political power of the 
presidency, and improved the PRI's electoral fortunes.32 With the PRI's 
electoral recovery and the approval of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Salinas entered the last year of his presidency with consider-
able political capital. The presidential succession is the most impor-
tant—and potentially most vulnerable—moment in Mexico's six-year 
political calendar, offering rival factions an institutionalized opportunity 
to compete for power. The potential for conflict is always great (the 
previous three presidential successions had been particularly fraught 
with political tension), and a slowdown in economic growth in late 1993 
31
 As of late 1993, the PRI was organized around a National Front of Citizens' Organiza-
tions, an Urban Popular Territorial Movement, a Worker-Peasant Pact, and other organiza-
tions. The Worker-Peasant Pact, signed in June 1992 between the CTM and the National 
Peasants' Confederation (CNC), was designed to promote productivity and increase 
consumer access to commodities. For details, see Rodriguez Guillen and Mora Heredia 
1993: 27. 
32One important measure of Salinas's success was that the PRI won 61.4 percent of the 
vote in the 1991 midterm congressional elections. 
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was additional cause for concern. Yet the existence of substantial inter-
national financial reserves, a government budgetary surplus, and the 
prospect that the approval of the NAFTA would attract significant 
additional amounts of foreign investment all suggested that the govern-
ment would be able to stimulate the economy prior to the 1994 elections 
and simultaneously guard against currency speculation. With the impo-
sition of Luis Donaldo Colosio as the PRI's 1994 presidential candidate, 
Salinas seemed on the verge of completing his sexenio in a stronger 
political position than any Mexican president in the preceding three 
decades. More generally Salinas's effective control of the succession 
process indicated to many observers that he had achieved his goal of 
implementing extensive market reforms before undertaking serious 
political liberalization. 
However, two events dramatically brought the question of democ-
racy to the center of national political debate. First, on January 1, 1994, 
some two thousand guerrilla fighters temporarily occupied San Cristo-
bal de las Casas and three other towns in Chiapas.33 In a masterstroke of 
timing, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation took up arms on the 
very day that the North American Free Trade Agreement formally went 
into effect. The Zapatistas explicitly and forcefully challenged the nega-
tive social consequences of neoliberal economic reforms, especially for 
indigenous peoples.34 They demanded broad political autonomy for 
regions populated predominantly by indigenous peoples, the reversal of 
Salinas's 1991 modifications to Article 27 of the 1917 federal Constitution, 
the reorientation of government economic policies, and political democ-
racy in Mexico. Although many Mexicans disavowed violence as a 
means of redressing grievances, the groundswell of support the 
Zapatista movement received from across the social spectrum was 
compelling evidence of popular dissatisfaction with both key elements 
33
 Among the immediate casualties of the Zapatista rebellion was the view that the 
Salinas administration had successfully engineered a far-reaching program of economic 
restructuring without provoking major political or social upheavals. For one statement of 
this view, see Lustig 1992:12. 
Whether President Salinas and his top national security and military advisers fully 
appreciated the scope of guerrilla activity in Chiapas, but failed to act against the 
Zapatistas for fear of endangering U. S. congressional approval of the NAFTA, remains a 
subject of debate. The Mexican army had clashed briefly with guerrillas in Chiapas in May 
1993, and in August 1993 the Mexican press carried reports of a guerrilla movement in the 
state. See Castaneda 1994a: 21; Economist, January 8, 1994, p. 41. 
This summary of the Chiapas uprising draws on the following sources: New York Times, 
January 3,1994, p. All, January 7,1994, p. A4, January 9,1994, p. 1, January 30,1994, p. 9, 
February 2,1994, p. A10, February 9,1994, pp. Al, 7, February 20,1994, p. 3, February 26, 
1994, p. 6, March 4,1994, p. A2, March 18,1994, p. A3, March 23,1994, p. A6; Economist, 
January 8, 1994, pp. 41^2; January 15, 1994, p. 39, February 19, 1994, p. 43; Academia 
Mexicana de Derechos Humanos 1994d. 
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 The EZLN's military leader and most prominent public spokesperson, who identified 
himself only as "Sub-Comandante Marcos," stated that "The free-trade agreement is a 
death certificate for the Indian peoples of Mexico" (quoted in New York Times, January 3, 
1994, p. All). 
of Salinas's economic program and his attempt to postpone democratiza-
tion.35 
The Salinas administration initially blamed the uprising on libera-
tion theology activists and Central American leftist subversives, and it 
responded to the Zapatista challenge with military force. In heavy 
fighting that left at least 145 dead, army troops supported by tanks and 
aircraft forced the Zapatistas to withdraw from occupied towns to more 
secure bases in the heavily forested highlands of Chiapas. Yet the scale 
of the government's military offensive and evidence of serious human 
rights abuses by government troops provoked intense domestic and 
international protests. Growing domestic opposition to the use of mili-
tary force (including large demonstrations in Mexico City and other 
major Mexican cities in early January), indications that the EZLN 
enjoyed widespread political support in indigenous communities 
throughout central Chiapas, concern that prolonged conflict might 
spark armed opposition movements elsewhere in Mexico, and fear that 
foreign investors would lose confidence in his administration soon 
forced President Salinas to suspend military activities. 
On January 12, 1994, President Salinas declared a unilateral cease-
fire and proposed a negotiated settlement, of the Chiapas conflict. He 
appointed Manuel Camacho Soils (the former mayor of Mexico City and 
Colosio's chief rival for the 1994 presidential nomination) as "commis-
sioner for peace and reconciliation in Chiapas." By early March, Cama-
cho had reached a tentative peace agreement with the Zapatistas. The 
'Accords for a Dignified Peace in Chiapas" pledged a significant increase 
in government social welfare (education, health care, housing) and 
infrastructure (improved roads and communications infrastructure) 
spending in Chiapas, resolution of long-standing peasant demands for 
land, explicit legal sanctions for discrimination against indigenous peo-
ples, and a degree of local administrative autonomy for indigenous 
communities. 
Just as the shock waves produced by the Zapatista uprising began to 
subside and the Salinas administration appeared to recover the political 
initiative,36 Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated at a campaign rally 
in Tijuana on March 23,1994. Government spokesmen initially claimed 
that the gunman, a maquiladora worker named Mario Aburto Martinez, 
had acted alone. However, in early April the special prosecutor in charge 
35The Zapatista challenge was an all-the-more-telling indictment of the Salinas adminis-
tration's economic and social policies because more PRONASOL funds had been expended 
in Chiapas than in any other state. 
^Between January and mid-March 1994 there was intense speculation in Mexican 
political circles that Camacho would capitalize on the public attention generated by his role 
as government representative in the Chiapas peace negotiations by declaring his candidacy 
for the presidency. At times, the prospect of a Camacho candidacy overshadowed Colosio's 
presidential campaign. Only on March 22 did Camacho publicly announce that he would 
not run for the presidency (New York Times, March 23,1994, p. A6). 
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of the case announced four additional arrests and indicated that as many 
as seven individuals (several of whom had close ties to the Baja Califor-
nia state police) had collaborated to kill Colosio.37 Widespread public 
speculation about who might have masterminded the apparent conspir-
acy significantly complicated President Salinas's effort to impose a 
second PRI candidate. Indeed, the struggle that raged between Salinas's 
political and economic allies and PRI traditionalists over the selection of 
Colosio's successor was remarkably public.38 In the end, however, 
Salinas retained sufficient political strength to control the nomination 
process. A week after the Colosio assassination, he designated Ernesto 
Zedillo Ponce de Leon (an economist with a Ph.D. from Yale University, 
who had served as both minister of planning and budget and minister of 
education in the Salinas cabinet before resigning his government posi-
tion to manage Colosio's presidential campaign) as the PRI's presidential 
candidate.39 
In the wake of these political shocks, the Salinas administration 
came under still greater domestic and international pressure to speed the 
pace of political liberalization. The result was a still more extensive 
electoral reform.40 Legislation adopted in May 1994 further limited 
direct government and PRI influence over the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE),41 provided for independent examination of voter registration lists, 
lowered the ceiling on campaign spending, permitted foreign observers 
to witness elections, banned the use of public funds and government 
personnel to benefit the PRI, and established a special prosecutor to 
37New York Times, April 5,1994, p. Al. The special prosecutor in the case subsequently 
issued a report stating that Aburto had in fact acted alone. This finding was greeted by 
widespread public skepticism, prompting President Salinas to order a sweeping reex-
amination of the case. For details, see New York Times, July 14,1994, p. Al, July 15,1994, p. 
A6. 
3sNew York Times, March 28,1994, p. A2, March 30,1994, p. Al; Economist, April 2,1994, 
p. 40. 
Concerns regarding Mexico's economic and political stability appear to have shaped the 
succession struggle. Zedillo, who had played a prominent role in refinancing large 
Mexican private firms' foreign debt in the wake of Mexico's 1982 financial crisis, was 
evidently the candidate preferred by the domestic and foreign business communities. 
Moreover, a constitutional provision requiring that a presidential candidate resign govern-
ment office at least six months prior to his election effectively barred some potentially 
strong rivals. 
39The EZLN reacted to the political uncertainty created by the Colosio assassination by 
suspending negotiations with the government. It subsequently rejected the settlement 
proposed by the Salinas administration, arguing that the matters under discussion did not 
satisfy its demand for democratic change at the national level. For details, see New York 
Times, April 23,1994, p. A4, June 13,1994, pp. Al, 4, July 30,1994, p. A3. 
^This legislation originated in a "Pact for Peace, Democracy, and Justice" which the 
government and opposition parties negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the Chiapas 
revolt. See Whitehead, this volume. 
41For example, the reform initiative increased the independence of the Federal Electoral 
Institute by creating an eleven-member governing board, six of whose members were 
distinguished "citizen magistrates" without ties to the government or political parties. 
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pursue those accused of electoral fraud.42 Taken together, the four 
electoral reform laws enacted in 1990, 1993 (two different sets of 
changes), and 1994 formally established much more equal terms of 
interparty competition. 
SHIFTING PATTERNS OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
The heightened prominence of opposition parties and increased elec-
toral competitiveness in Mexico in the 1980s and early 1990s paralleled, 
and in part reflected the consequences of, significant changes in state-
society relations. The successful transition from an import-substitution 
model of economic development to one focused on export promotion 
would seemingly imply a reordering or a reaccommodation of the 
coalition of social actors supporting the Mexican regime. One key issue 
is the extent to which important changes in relations between social 
actors and the state are the product of economic restructuring, or 
whether they derive from political developments that follow a logic 
distinct from transformations in the economic sphere. Another concern 
is the extent to which changes within different social actors themselves 
and in their relations with the state somehow facilitate the adoption or 
consolidation of neoliberal economic reforms. 
The Salinas administration actively sought to redefine important 
aspects of state-society relations. This section examines the ways in 
which these relations were altered, whether the Salinas government 
succeeded in creating and consolidating new bases of social support for 
market reforms and the regime, and what implications these changes 
might have for future regime change in Mexico. 
CHANGES IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS 
The Salinas government attempted more actively than any presidential 
administration since the 1930s and 1940s to transform state-society 
relations. Prior to this, however, and throughout most of the 1980s, it was 
the economic crisis more than any overt government effort to redefine 
the state's role and its relations with different groups that shaped the 
actions of various elements of Mexican society. In some instances, the 
inability of state officials to respond adequately to popular needs left a 
vacuum that, particularly in urban areas, was filled by autonomously 
organized social movements. Paul Lawrence Haber (this volume) argues 
that it was the de la Madrid administration's neglect of housing needs, 
especially in the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquakes, that 
spurred the formation of some of Mexico's strongest urban popular 
movements. In other cases, the combination of economic constraints and 
42For evidence that the May 1994 reforms were only partially implemented before the 
August 1994 general elections, see New York Times, August 19,1994, pp. Al, 4. 
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state officials' unwillingness or inability to entertain certain types of 
demands compelled social actors to alter their bargaining strategies. For 
example, the de la Madrid government's refusal to accede to organized 
labor's wage demands caused the labor movement to alter its negotiating 
strategy during the early years of the economic crisis. Rather than 
focusing on wage increases, the "official" labor movement led by the 
Confederation of Mexican Workers concentrated its efforts on gaining 
greater protection for the individual worker as consumer. In the country-
side, too, state officials discouraged demands for land distribution, a 
policy that forced many rural organizations to focus on agricultural 
production issues and which generated divisions among them. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, state officials initiated 
more directed efforts to alter the state's economic and social role. In a 
number of areas, the Salinas administration sought to reduce the extent 
of state regulation. For example, the government shifted from sector-
wide price supports for rural producers to more focused initiatives such 
as PROCAMPO, a program that provided direct subsidies to small-scale 
agricultural producers. The National Solidarity Program also repre-
sented an effort to redirect government social policy away from broadly 
inclusive public welfare programs toward programs that directed state 
resources to specific constituencies in poor communities. 
A reduction in state regulation was consistent with the administra-
tion's neoliberal orientation. Nevertheless, some policy changes and 
some aspects of state reform were driven mainly by partisan electoral 
considerations—especially the government's efforts to neutralize the 
electoral threat posed by the Cardenista opposition—rather than by the 
requirements of neoliberal economic restructuring. From the perspec-
tive of government officials, more precisely targeted public programs 
would ease the social costs of economic adjustment, which were widely 
believed to have contributed heavily to the opposition vote in the 1988 
elections. These programs also promised to create identifiable constitu-
encies for the government's policy initiatives and build new bases of 
support for the regime. 
President Salinas was compelled to innovate in this area because the 
most immediate challenge he faced was to dilute the powerful political 
threat that the 1988 electoral results posed to the legitimacy of his 
administration. The 1988 elections had demonstrated the extent of the 
public's dissatisfaction with the PRI and pointed to the real possibility 
that a center-left party, headed by Cardenas, could consolidate durable 
support and pose a continuing threat to the ruling party. Moreover, the 
Cardenista campaign had successfully tapped into some of the PRI's 
traditional bases of support among workers and the urban poor, thereby 
underscoring the need for significant reform of the party. One of 
Salinas's first tasks, then, was to bring these sectors back into a relation-
30 Cook, Middkbrook, and Molinar Horcasitas 
ship with the state (if not yet the PRI) and to isolate them from the new 
party that Cardenas and his supporters were forming. 
Among the most important strategies that the new government 
adopted in pursuit of this goal was the policy of concertacidn social (social 
concertation). Concertacidn was to represent a new form of state-society 
relations, one in which the state established problem-solving partner-
ships with social organizations. By advocating concertacidn, the Salinas 
administration simultaneously sought to isolate those groups that still 
opposed it, convey a sense that the new government was willing to open 
a dialogue with those groups that had previously been excluded from 
policy circles, and indicate the proper channel through which societal 
interests should present their demands. 
The Salinas administration proceeded to extend offers of "dialogue" 
to targeted organizations, and it drew up agreements (corwenios de 
concertacidn) between the government and independent social movement 
organizations. Some of the first agreements signed were with urban 
popular movements. The 1989 convenio with the Popular Defense Com-
mittee (CDP) in Durango bore immediate political fruit by helping to 
drive a wedge between the Cardenista camp and some of the autono-
mous popular movements that had supported Cardenas during the 1988 
elections (see Haber, this volume): Similarly, in the labor sector the 
government's focus on social concertation was interpreted as a gesture of 
support for the leader of the Mexican Telephone Workers' Union (STRM) 
and his efforts to form a new labor federation that might compete with 
the long-dominant CTM. For many groups, concertation represented a 
shift in the state's relationship with society, toward an arrangement in 
which state officials sought to forge targeted, problem-solving relation-
ships with social organizations that demonstrated some degree of 
autonomy and the technical capacity to undertake specific projects.43 
The best-known and perhaps most distinctive social policy imple-
mented by the Salinas administration was the National Solidarity Pro-
gram. Funds from the government's sale of state enterprises were 
channeled into community projects that were ostensibly developed in 
conjunction with local Solidarity committees. Official pronouncements 
touted PRONASOL as an efficient poverty-alleviation program that 
sought to transform state-society relations by encouraging citizens to 
design and implement community development and public works proj-
ects. Some evaluative studies, however, indicate other—even contrary— 
results. For instance, contrary to official claims, PRONASOL funds were 
often directed to organized groups—that is, to those organizations with 
"superior technical capacity" and bargaining power, not to the weakest 
and poorest groups. One consequence was that the program strength-
43It is important to note, however, that this policy did not mean an end to state 
repression. Labor unions, urban protest groups, rural organizations, and opposition party 
activists often encountered violent state responses to their demands. 
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ened existing organizations and deepened the gap between the orga-
nized and the unorganized (Haber, Fox, this volume). 
Moreover, the government often channeled PRONASOL funds to 
areas where voters had supported Cardenas in 1988, lending some 
credibility to critics' claims that the Salinas administration used the 
program to undermine the opposition's electoral base (Molinar Hor-
casitas and Weldon 1994). Program administrators also placed political 
conditions on the distribution of PRONASOL funding in some areas. 
Resources often went to those organizations that would prove "coopera-
tive" —in other words, those that would refrain from open opposition to 
the PRI or the government (Haber, this volume). Most important, 
PRONASOL provided incentives for autonomous organizations to focus 
on local community development projects, rather than on national 
political demands or the construction of independent political alliances. 
PRONASOL embodied key elements of the administration's pro-
posed "new" relationship with society. This relationship was to consist 
of a state that was pluralistic in its relations with social groups, one that 
established ties to groups outside of the ruling party's traditional sector 
organizations—even at the expense of the latter and of political parties in 
general. For example, the CTM and the National Peasants' Confederation 
(CNC), which long enjoyed a privileged political position as official 
sectors of the PRI, were forced to compete for resources with more 
autonomous social organizations. In many cases, membership in the PRI 
was no longer a requirement for access to state resources. Policies such as 
these further weakened the regime's traditional social bases and the 
governing party's electoral coalition at a time when alternative sources of 
political support were not yet consolidated. 
Although the Salinas administration established relationships with 
some organizations that could be considered democratic, the govern-
ment's more pluralistic relations with societal interests did not neces-
sarily indicate greater official support for more democratic forms of 
representation within these organizations. Nor did this approach signal 
state encouragement of independent forms of political expression. 
Rather, state officials' relations with a greater variety of social organiza-
tions reflected pragmatic concerns more than a new commitment to 
democracy. For instance, not only did Salinas administration officials 
maintain strong control over labor strikes, but several important labor 
conflicts involving workers' struggles for democratic union representa-
tion were repressed. In other cases, state officials and employers collabo-
rated to impose more flexible industrial relations policies in the work-
place, actions that sometimes undermined union democracy.44 
44
 Among the most important of these conflicts were those that occurred at the Ford 
Motor Company's Cuautitlan plant, the Tornel Rubber Company, Modelo Brewery, Volks-
wagen, and the Cananea (Sonora) copper mines. For a discussion of these cases, see Cook 
n.d.; La Botz 1992. 
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Even as state officials developed ties with a broader range of societal 
interests during the Salinas years, they narrowed the scope of issues 
open to negotiation. Democratically governed social organizations had 
access to government resources if they were willing to concert with the 
state on local-level, "technical" problems directly affecting them. In the 
labor sector, for example, the Salinas government pursued somewhat 
contradictory agendas: support for more politically independent (and, at 
least in the past, more militant) unions, while conducting its overall 
relations with the labor movement in such a way that there was "less real 
negotiation than before" (de la Garza, this volume). 
Furthermore, the state's relations with social actors were strongly 
influenced by both Salinas's personalistic style of governing and the 
institutional power of the presidency. Salinas, adopting a leadership 
style reminiscent of that practiced by former president Luis Echeverria, 
attempted to step "outside the system" in order to change it in the wake 
of the 1988 elections. In so doing, Salinas transferred popular percep-
tions of illegitimacy from his government to the PRI and successfully 
portrayed himself as a reformer struggling against hard-line interests 
within the party (see Dresser, this volume). Salinas's ability to manipu-
late this distinction between the party and his government depended on 
his effective use of the considerable powers afforded to the federal 
executive under the Mexican system. His attacks on "official" labor 
leaders, for example, were among a series of actions taken near the 
beginning of his term that marked Salinas as a strong president willing 
to employ his executive authority to change the system by punishing 
political enemies and hard-line opponents of reform. Moreover, Salinas's 
close personal identification with the National Solidarity Program (in-
cluding weekly trips to different states to inspect PRONASOL projects 
and distribute funds) both bolstered his personal popularity and rein-
forced presidentialism (Bailey 1994: 117-19; Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 
1994b: 14; Dresser 1991). 
The strongly presidentialist character of the Salinas administration 
(a phenomenon noted by several authors in this volume) was in part a 
product of Salinas's efforts to build a political defense against the 
negative consequences of his administration's economic policies, some of 
which harmed the entrenched interests of key sectors of the president's 
own party. Dresser (this volume), for example, argues that a reinvigo-
rated presidentialism reflected Salinas's quest for increased state auton-
omy during a period of rapid economic restructuring. In this sense, 
developments in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s roughly 
paralleled those in some other Latin American countries (especially 
Argentina and Peru) where incumbent presidents sought to enhance 
their executive authority in order to implement neoliberal economic 
reforms. Yet strengthened executive authority poses difficult questions 
where democratization is concerned, an issue that has elicited a range of 
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different opinions. For some analysts, a strong president is necessary to 
promote democratic reform against the resistance of state and local 
political bosses and other hard-line elements within the ruling party 
(Cornelius 1994). For others, presidentialism is one of the key obstacles to 
democratization (Garrido 1989; Meyer 1989). 
In the shorter term, Salinas's personalist style of governing had 
important implications for the character of state-society relations. For 
example, his use of executive powers to reshape relations with different 
social actors encouraged the leaders of mass organizations to develop 
ties directly with him rather than with the PRI. This was especially true 
of some union leaders who, in a political environment that was generally 
hostile to labor, negotiated directly with the president for official recog-
nition and political protection (Cook 1994). Leaders of urban popular 
organizations such as the CDP in Durango pursued similar tactics 
(Haber, this volume). Although this kind of direct relationship with the 
president is certainly not without precedent in Mexico, the relative 
decline of other sources of leverage or mediation (such as political 
representation in the PRI) makes stronger dependence on the executive a 
more significant political phenomenon. 
In an important sense, social actors' heightened dependence on 
personalized "relations with the president for organizational gains and 
survival indicated a serious weakening of key political institutions— 
especially the ruling party—that have long supported and legitimated 
the regime. Rather than reflecting a broad commitment to political 
beliefs such as those embodied in revolutionary nationalism or a prag-
matic set of calculations regarding long-term political inclusion (such as 
state-subsidized organizations' claims of a "right" to political represen-
tation in the PRI), such ties to the federal executive reflected momentary 
highly pragmatic, inherently unstable "alliances" based on specific 
bargaining relationships. In this context, one must ask whether person-
alistic ties forged between independent social actors and Salinas could 
represent the first step toward the creation of new bases of social support 
for market reforms and the regime. 
CHANGES AMONG SOCIAL ACTORS 
One way to answer this question is to examine the effects of the Salinas 
administration's policies on key social actors and to evaluate then-
responses to state officials' attempts to redefine state-society relations. 
There are two reasons why it is important to focus on changing relations 
between the state and mass actors. First, mass actors such as labor 
unions and peasant organizations have long comprised the Mexican 
regime's principal bases of social support. Second, a number of indepen-
dent organizations have emerged within these sectors in the last two 
decades. Many of their members threw their support behind Cardenas 
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in the 1988 elections, giving their actions and their relationship to the 
regime an added political significance. 
A wide variety of social organizations exists within different sectors, 
ranging from independent popular groups that emerged in the 1970s 
and 1980s to "official" sectoral organizations such as the CTM and the 
CNC which are more closely identified with the regime. It is, therefore, 
difficult to generalize by sector about the character of state-society 
relations. Indeed, even those organizations that could be labeled politi-
cally "independent" vary greatly in terms of their strategies and political 
orientation. Furthermore, many of these groups—both autonomous 
social movements and "official" organizations closely allied with state 
elites—have been undergoing a significant process of reorganization. 
Yet in spite of differences such as these, many independent social 
organizations were forced to respond to a similar set of circumstances in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Changes in the state's approach to these 
organizations had a significant impact on their strategies and, in some 
cases, their internal organization. 
In the first instance, most popular organizations had to determine 
what position to take vis-a-vis Cardenas's 1988 presidential campaign 
and the political aftermath of the elections. In the weeks and months 
after the elections, Cardenas called for his supporters to reject the new 
government's overtures, while the Salinas administration demonstrated 
a willingness to channel resources to many organizations that had 
previously been politically marginalized. In practice, popular organiza-
tions adopted a range of strategic responses to this conjuncture. For 
example, Haber (this volume) discusses how the Assembly of Neighbor-
hoods in Mexico City chose to remain loyal to the PRD, even when 
offered an opportunity to form its own political party and even when the 
price for loyalty to the political opposition was a decline in its own 
membership. In contrast, the Popular Defense Committee (CDP) in 
Durango was among the first groups to negotiate a convenio de concerta-
cion with the Salinas government. The CDP also left the PRD coalition 
and, along with other organizations and with the backing of the Salinas 
administration, formed a new political party (the Labor Party, FT) in 
order to compete in local and national elections. Other organizations, 
including the National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organi-
zations (UNORCA), refused to adopt a partisan position during the 
elections and continued their established practice of negotiating with 
state officials (Fox, this volume). 
Those popular organizations that eventually decided to participate 
in state-sponsored programs shifted both their overall strategies and 
specific tactics in response to the Salinas administration's willingness to 
establish a dialogue and enter into specific agreements defined around 
community-based projects. For example, Fox (this volume) refers to the 
"new political pragmatism" evident among many rural organizations 
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during this period as they moved to take advantage of state resources 
while simultaneously struggling to retain their autonomy and manage 
internal dissent. One challenge such organizations faced was to propose 
projects and alternative policies that stood a chance of being adopted 
(ser propositivo), rather than simply to contest government proposals or 
adopt confrontational strategies based on principle—a more common 
approach during the 1970s and early 1980s. This meant that many 
organizations occupied a large "gray area," not only in terms of strategy 
and tactics but also in terms of their degree of representativeness and 
their political affiliation. Fox points out that older distinctions between 
"official" and "independent" social organizations (the former category 
referring to state-subsidized and PRI-affiliated organizations and the 
latter to those groups not affiliated with the ruling party) are no longer 
very useful in differentiating among rural groups. Indeed, to the extent 
to which PRI affiliation is no longer a condition for access to state 
resources and ties to political parties do not accurately depict the specific 
policy positions taken by different organizations, these categories may 
have become less relevant in other sectors as well. 
Direct negotiations between the government and popular organiza-
tions over local projects decentralized in practice the terrain on which 
dialogue (and conflict) took place. The opportunity to qualify for 
PRONASOL funds, for example, encouraged urban popular movements 
"to relegate national considerations to a lower priority in favor of concen-
trating on their own organizational development" (Haber, this volume). 
In the labor sector, issues related to productivity in the workplace 
(including the right to information, problems associated with the intro-
duction of new technologies, worker training, workplace participation, 
and so forth) became the key point of negotiation for many unions (de la 
Garza, this volume). Popular organization politics, more so than party 
politics, is concerned with local issues and the immediate satisfaction of 
concrete demands. The Salinas administration's willingness to discuss 
such demands with previously marginalized groups soon after the 1988 
electoral challenge helped to prevent the consolidation of broader oppo-
sition political alliances. 
The shift in state officials' approach to dealing with popular organi-
zations, and the change in strategy that some organizations adopted in 
turn, generated tensions between these organizations and the PRD, 
between popular organizations and the state, and both among and 
within these organizations. In the first case, strains between the PRD 
and many popular organizations that had supported Cardenas's 1988 
presidential campaign stemmed in part from the different priorities held 
by party leaders and social movements (Bruhn n.d.). In particular, the 
new opposition party's need to consolidate an identity distinct from the 
PRI conflicted with many organizations' need to negotiate with the state 
to secure benefits for their membership. According to Haber (this 
36 Cook, Middlebrook, and Molinar Horcasitas 
volume), the PRD's unwillingness to acknowledge the imperative of 
popular organizations to meet their members' needs by accepting public 
resources quickly led to conflict. The fact that some organizations had 
both struck deals with the government and, in the process, distanced 
themselves from the PRD further undermined the likelihood of future 
electoral alliances with Mexico's most important leftist party. 
Popular organizations also found that their new relationship with 
the state raised a number of other thorny—and classic—problems. One 
of these concerned the degree to which their organizational autonomy 
was compromised by accepting state support. Although popular groups 
needed government resources (housing, potable water, paved roads, 
financial credit, and so forth) in order to sustain themselves organiza-
tionally and maintain membership support, reliance on the state for 
such resources often threatened their ability to make decisions autono-
mously, especially with regard to their strategy and political alliances.45 
As Fox points out in his chapter in this volume, defining a clear political 
or civic identity could endanger a popular organization's access to 
political elites and to the discretionary resources they controlled.46 
Moreover, the Salinas administration's strategy of concertacion and 
many popular groups' willingness to strike deals with the government 
generated significant divisions both among and within these organiza-
tions. Government representatives singled out those that participated in 
state programs as more "modern," pragmatic, and reasonable organiza-
tions, able to recognize the "change in terrain" and shift their strategies 
accordingly. Those that did not participate were labeled "confronta-
tional," stuck in an earlier period when politics was more polarized. 
Within popular organizations, participation in government programs 
often generated tensions between leaders and rank-and-file members. 
Indeed, the more democratic or representative these organizations were, 
the greater the likelihood of such problems. Rural organizations' sup-
port for modifications of Article 27 of the Constitution was a case in 
point; opposition to the Salinas administration's plans meant loss of 
access to government resources, yet leaders who supported the reform 
risked alienating their membership (Fox, this volume). 
Whether the practice of concertation between the state and popular 
organizations during the Salinas years merely constituted a form of co-
optation, or whether participation of this kind reflects a more pragmatic 
yet still independent vision among popular organization leaders, are 
45The alternative was perhaps best exemplified by the Assembly of Neighborhoods, a 
member of the urban popular movement. As noted above, its loyalty to the PRD and its 
commitment to a national political strategy cost it access to state resources and ultimately 
led to a decline in its membership (Haber, this volume). 
'"'It is important to acknowledge, however, that tensions between popular organiza-
tions and the PRD were also the product of struggles over organizational autonomy, 
especially over the terms under which these organizations would participate in a political 
movement and the threat that such participation posed to their operational autonomy. 
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questions that are not easily answered. Leaders of the CDP, for example, 
claimed that they were practicing "situational politics" and that they 
could simply "take back" their autonomy whenever they chose (Haber, 
this volume). Moguel (1994:176) points out that for some sectors of the 
left that participated in PRONASOL, the program represented more 
than a matter of pragmatism and a temporary coincidence of particular 
interests. Rather, it allowed them to "struggle against corporate and 
cacique interests" and "change the relationship between society and the 
state," long-time political goals for much of the social left. 
In this context, conventional conceptions of co-optation may ob-
scure more than they illuminate about new patterns of state-society 
relations. Participation in state programs under Salinas may well reflect 
organization leaders' beliefs that they were simply furthering their own 
social and political agenda, and that at least in the short term some of 
their goals coincided with those of reformist elements within the state 
bureaucracy. Participation of this kind (with its inevitable compromises 
and trade-offs) may also reflect the conflicting imperatives that move-
ment leaders must face in both satisfying member demands and avoid-
ing co-optation, as well as the limited number of choices (political and 
strategic) that popular organizations have traditionally had in Mexico. 
From this perspective, the absence thus far of a viable political party 
alternative in Mexico, the worldwide erosion of socialism as an economic 
and political project, and the still powerful role of the Mexican state in 
controlling key political and economic resources greatly limit the options 
of popular organizations that wish to survive. 
Even if social concertation as practiced during the Salinas adminis-
tration succeeded in undermining social actors' ability to form alliances 
with the political opposition, it remains to be seen whether the new, 
tentative alliances forged between heretofore independent popular orga-
nizations and the state will translate into medium- or long-term support 
for the regime. Although some groups may have gained materially and 
politically from their closer relationship with the state, evidence con-
cerning the larger significance of these ties is mixed. On the one hand, 
Salinas administration spokespersons for PRONASOL claimed that the 
program "empowered" average citizens by encouraging them to design 
and help implement community-based projects. Academic analysts 
have also found evidence for the program's empowering potential 
among both organizations and unorganized individuals (Cornelius, 
Craig, and Fox 1994a; Haber 1994). A key issue, however, is how citizen 
empowerment in everyday activities will be reflected at the polls. Are the 
new clients created by PRONASOL likely to replace the regime's tradi-
tional allies as its principal bases of social and electoral support? 
Many observers attributed the PRI's electoral comeback in 1991 in 
part to the popularity of PRONASOL. It is, however, difficult to separate 
the effect that PRONASOL might have had on voters' attitudes from the 
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impact of other important developments, including a sharp decline in 
the rate of inflation (Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 1994b: 13-14). Moreover, 
several considerations raise unresolved questions about the long-term 
success of the Salinas administration's efforts to secure the political 
loyalty of PRONASOL beneficiaries and of those groups engaged in 
concertation with the government. The fact that PRONASOL was ini-
tially portrayed as a government—not a PRI—program (indeed, a pro-
gram closely identified with Salinas, and later with Colosio,47 person-
ally); that beneficiaries of PRONASOL-sponsored public works did not 
always identify these projects with the program (Contreras and Bennett 
1994: 286); and that many of the program's beneficiaries were autono-
mous social organizations that may in fact have used access to its 
resources to strengthen their independence and regional political influ-
ence all make it unlikely that PRONASOL successfully consolidated 
durable support for the ruling party. The personalist politics behind the 
program, the death of Colosio, and the way in which the Chiapas 
uprising at least partially discredited the program raise further ques-
tions concerning PRONASOL's future. 
At the same time, there is also increasing uncertainty concerning the 
political loyalty of the regime's older social allies. In spite of the Salinas 
administration's early efforts to disassociate the government from tradi-
tional sectors of the ruling party, state elites were obliged to rely on these 
sectors for political support in a context of rapid, dramatic economic 
change and unstable political coalitions. The appearance of widespread 
public support for the administration's inflation-fighting economic pack-
age (the PECE), the North American Free Trade Agreement, and ejido 
reform was particularly important for the Salinas administration. How-
ever, the support of old allies has become increasingly contingent upon 
receiving significant economic or political concessions from the state.. 
The "official" labor movement, for example, became an important (if 
reluctant) supporter of Salinas's economic program and his choice of 
successor—but at the price of the administration's retreat on key aspects 
of PRI reorganization and labor law reform. Concessions such as these 
may strengthen the political position of major sociopolitical organiza-
tions, perhaps leading to future conflicts as issues that were postponed 
for political reasons are revisited in a future administration. 
However, continued reliance on the political support of traditional 
sector organizations raises difficult questions. How long can the Mexi-
can regime retain the old-style corporatist features that have defined it 
for so long? Are such corporatist arrangements ultimately compatible 
with the country's new model of economic development and a more 
democratic regime? There is considerable debate on these points. Some 
47
 As minister of social development, Colosio was the cabinet member directly responsi-
ble for the program. 
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observers argue that central features of Mexican corporatism—espe-
cially state intervention and tutelage over certain sectors of society such 
as the labor movement, and the top-down controls that state-subsidized 
organizations exercise over their members—are strongly incompatible 
with a modern economy that must rely on the increased participation, 
initiative, and productivity of its workforce in order to thrive. Other 
analysts speak of a "reformed corporatism" or "neocorporatism" that 
differs from the previous form in that social organizations' relations with 
the PRI are more flexible or formally disappear, even though their central 
link with the government is maintained through the presidency (de la 
Garza, this volume). 
One important question in this debate is whether some elements of 
the old corporatist system survive because hard-line elements (partic-
ularly leaders of the "official" labor movement and traditional PRI 
politicians with sectoral ties—the "dinosaurs") have successfully re-
sisted change. Or have established corporatist arrangements remained 
in place because they contribute to economic and political elites' at-
tempts to maintain political control and limit instability during a period 
of significant economic change? The distinction is an important one. The 
former interpretation suggests that older patterns of state-society rela-
tions in Mexico are gradually being replaced in a transition toward a 
different kind of regime. However, the latter interpretation implies that 
those features of Mexico's authoritarian regime that enabled elites to 
maintain control over workers and other mass actors will remain impor-
tant elements of a more electorally competitive political regime because 
those groups that substantially strengthened their position in the 1980s 
and early 1990s—the private sector and technocrats—favor them.48 
If, however, one accepts that the Salinas administration's concerta-
tion with popular organizations led to the greater empowerment of at 
least some of these groups, changes in state-society relations during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s may have helped instead to generate multiple 
empowered groups with significant local or regional political influence, 
organized elements that are capable of challenging the PRI machine in 
local and state elections. Indeed, there is evidence that this has already 
begun to happen in places like Durango, where a CDP candidate won 
the mayoralty of the capital city in 1992 (Haber, this volume). The 
material benefits and increased prestige and influence that popular 
organizations derive from access to public resources, and their conse-
quent ability to meet membership demands, make it quite possible that 
these groups will exercise their local or regional power to influence 
future electoral contests. As a result, the Salinas administration may 
^Future political change along these lines would be consistent with the "modernization 
of authoritarianism" scenario outlined by Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith (1989: 40-41), 
in which Mexico's political elites would engage in an "energetic revival and remodeling of 
the existing corporatist system." 
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have helped to undermine PRI control in some regions, thus creating a 
political environment in which the PRI dominates at the national level 
but in which state and municipal elections are increasingly won by 
opposition parties in alliance with regional social movements. This is a 
model of political liberalization that may prove acceptable to factions of 
the national political elite that are willing to make such concessions at 
the expense of local PRI bosses.49 
In sum, economic and political reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 
early 1990s alienated some of the regime's old allies, without yet securing 
the proven loyalty of new clients. In an environment in which estab-
lished links between the electorate and political parties have weakened 
(the dealignment that Klesner describes), the Salinas administration's 
efforts to de-link the regime's traditional social bases from the PRI could 
render their future electoral support increasingly unstable, especially as 
political alternatives present themselves. During the Salinas years, state 
elites forged new ties with social actors outside the ruling party, but it 
remains to be seen whether these relationships can be institutionalized 
in the form of durable support for the PRI. In a context of decreased 
citizen tolerance of authoritarianism and increased pressures for full 
electoral democracy, the presence of dealigned social actors can be 
crucially important, contributing centrally to the emergence of a more 
competitive regime. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether authoritarian regimes are necessarily more capable than demo-
cratic governments of implementing economic stabilization'measures 
and market reforms is a subject of continuing debate.50 There is little 
doubt, however, that Mexico's experience with economic liberalization in 
the 1980s and early 1990s was strongly shaped by the survival of 
authoritarian political controls. Such key features of the postrevolution-
ary regime as the incumbent president's capacity to name his successor, 
the federal executive's dominance of the legislature, "official" party and 
state control over the electoral process, and state administrative restric-
tions on nonelectoral forms of mass participation persisted during much 
of this period despite a significant increase in electoral competitiveness 
and heightened activity by relatively autonomous societal groups. 
The fact that the scope and speed of economic liberalization consid-
erably exceeded the extent and pace of political opening in Mexico had 
important consequences both for the process of economic restructuring 
49It is also a model of political liberalization whose expected outcome has been likened 
to India's political system, in which the Congress Party dominates national politics but 
other political movements enjoy considerable autonomy at the state and local levels 
(Cornelius, Gentleman, and Smith 1989: 41-^ 43). 
soFor contrasting views, see Skidmore 1977 and Remmer 1990, 1993. 
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and for democratization. The sequencing of economic and political 
liberalization altered the balance of forces within the coalition that-l^as 
traditionally supported the regime. In particular, privatization, dereg-
ulation, and the shift toward an export-oriented development model 
increased the influence of the private sector (especially large manufac-
turers and financial interests) within Mexico's governing coalition and 
privileged those businesses most closely linked to the international 
market. At the same time, the preservation of tight political controls on 
organized labor limited unions' capacity to redress the negative effects 
of market reforms. State administrative restrictions on labor participa-
tion also eased employers' implementation of changes in the production 
process that further undermined the bargaining power of workers. It is, 
moreover, doubtful that the Mexican government's economic stabiliza-
tion measures and market reforms—policies that produced very high 
social costs in the form of a dramatic decline in real wage levels, 
increased unemployment in major industries, and a more unequal 
pattern of income distribution—could have been pursued as consis-
tently in a democratic political context. 
In some ways, economic reform strengthened the position of Mexico's 
ruling political elite. Generally improved economic prospects, effective 
control of inflation, and consumers' access to a much broader range of 
imported goods won considerable public support for market reforms and 
the Salinas administration. Renewed growth (even at a rate that was low by 
historical Mexican standards) and the sale of state-owned enterprises 
increased the financial resources available to government officials in their 
efforts to address social problems that were exacerbated by economic crisis 
and restructuring. The popularity of government social programs such as 
PRONASOL and PROCAMPO most likely contributed to the PRI's elec-
toral recovery in the early 1990s. Broader public support for neoliberal 
policies also narrowed the programmatic options for opposition parties, 
making it more difficult for the PRD to convince voters that it represented a 
distinctive alternative. Of course, political factors (the strength of institu-
tions such as the presidency, the continued loyalty of such traditional allies 
as the "offidal" organized labor movement, the regime's capacity for 
renewal from within through regular rotation in office) also contributed 
significantly to the governing elite's capacity to maintain control while 
limiting the scope and regulating the pace of political liberalization. But 
under less favorable economic conditions, the Mexican regime would 
probably have been much more vulnerable to uncontrolled pressures for 
political change. 
Market reforms did not, however, succeed in delaying pressures for 
democratization, despite President Salinas's reliance on economic perfor-
mance rather than political reform to legitimate his government. Cer-
tainly by the late 1980s the social dislocations caused by rapid economic 
restructuring contributed directly to challenges to authoritarian political 
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controls. Popular dissatisfaction with austerity policies and the negative 
consequences of economic liberalization reinvigorated opposition parties, 
accelerated the partisan dealignment of Mexican voters, and contributed to 
the increased competitiveness of electoral contests. The Mexican govern-
ment's implementation of market reforms also began to erode the regime's 
traditional bases of mass support and created new lines of division within 
the political elite. Moreover, the passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement substantially increased international scrutiny of domestic polit-
ical practices. One consequence is that elements of future economic success 
(especially investor confidence and continued access to foreign capital) may 
become increasingly contingent upon the credibility of electoral outcomes. 
The future prospect of improved economic performance may well 
restore public confidence in the governing political elite's ability to guide 
economic policy. However, in the absence of democracy it is unlikely that 
the Mexican regime can ever fully recoup the legitimacy that postrevolu-
tionary governments once enjoyed. This challenge looms even larger 
now that neoliberal reformers have broken decisively with statist eco-
nomic policies, thereby sharply curtailing their capacity to employ 
revolutionary nationalism to bind together ideologically a hetero-
geneous governing coalition. The philosophy of "social liberalism" 
espoused by the Salinas administration has yet to gel as an inclusive 
ideology capable of legitimating the Mexican regime in the way that 
revolutionary nationalism once did.51 
Can one conclude, then, that the direct and indirect political conse-
quences of economic restructuring have significantly increased the odds 
that Mexico will eventually make a successful transition to democracy? The 
evidence is mixed. The erosion of the regime's traditional social bases, 
greater disunity within Mexico's governing political elite, and more vig-
orous party competition all increase the likelihood of regime change. 
Opposition parties on both the left and right have developed a stronger 
organizational presence in many regions, and since the mid-1980s they 
have had significant practical experience in governing at state and munici-
pal levels. At the same time, changes in state-society relations under the 
Salinas administration—including a greater degree of pluralism in the 
state's relations with social actors, the reduced relevance of ties to the 
"official" party for access to state-sponsored programs, and efforts to 
redefine the role of traditional sectoral organizations within the PRI— 
potentially increase the autonomy of major social actors vis-a-vis the state 
and the ruling party. These developments may hold important implications 
for national politics. 
The 1994 election campaign clearly exemplified the political impor-
tance of a more vigorous civil society. Much more active involvement by 
51A transcript of President Salinas's March 4, 1992, address to the PRI outlining the 
philosophy of social liberalism appears in Examen 35 (April 1992): 19-22. 
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nongovernmental organizations, together with new electoral rules and 
heightened international attention to political developments in Mexico, 
created a more open electoral environment, even though irregularities 
continued to be a significant problem in some areas.52 Citizen organiza-
tions such as the Civic Alliance (AC), a coalition of some four hundred 
nongovernmental organizations committed to promoting clean elec-
tions, played an especially important role in monitoring the election 
process.53 Similarly, the Democratic National Convention convened by 
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in early August 1994—an 
event attended by some five thousand representatives from a wide range 
of urban, rural, and indigenous organizations, as well as by prominent 
intellectuals—demonstrated the commitment of broad sectors of the 
social and political left to free elections and a peaceful democratic 
transition.54 Perhaps more than anything else, it was increased citizen 
interest and involvement in the electoral process (reflected in a record 
voter turnout of 77.7 percent) that set 1994 apart from any previous 
election in Mexican history. 
Other developments during the late 1980s and early 1990s were, 
however, less conducive to the construction of democracy. The exer-
cise of strong presidential authority that was a persistent feature of the 
Salinas administration undermined public credibility of the electoral 
process by, for example, substituting deals negotiated between the 
executive and opposition parties for the outcomes produced by legal 
procedures. Strong state controls over labor protest and other forms of 
nonelectoral participation greatly restricted mass organizations' room 
for maneuver and undercut efforts by some of their members to 
democratize their organizations. Social programs such as PRONASOL 
encouraged popular organizations formally aligned with the opposi-
tion to focus predominantly on local agendas, thus helping to diffuse 
and (at least until the Chiapas rebellion) postpone national debate 
over democracy during much of the Salinas period. Similarly, Salinas's 
success at fostering personalistic ties with some independent labor 
unions, urban popular movements, and other social organizations 
increased their dependence on the government and reduced the 
likelihood that they would forge alliances with opposition parties. 
52For more on this aspect of the elections, see El Financiero International, August 29-
September 4,1994, p. 13, September 5-11,1994, p. 15; New York Times, August 25,1994, 
p. A3, September 27,1994, p. A7; Perfil de la Jornada, September 20,1994, pp. 1-4. 
53Members of the Civic Alliance scrutinized voter registration lists, commissioned 
opinion polls concerning citizens' familiarity with the electoral process, published 
analyses showing that campaign coverage by electronic media was heavily biased in 
favor of the ruling PRI, and coordinated the activities of thousands of domestic and 
foreign election observers. In addition, the Alliance conducted a "fast count" of 
electoral results on the basis of a stratified national survey of polling places. 
54For details, see Los Angeles Times, August 6,1994, p. A10; Hernandez Navarro 1994. 
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Such developments weakened the link between increased societal 
pluralism and pressures for electoral democracy. 
Even more important, the concentrated power of the federal 
executive and the persistence of close links between the state appa-
ratus and the PRI continued to limit political competition. Most 
national and international observers agreed that the 1994 elections 
were generally free of the extensive fraud and intimidation that had 
characterized many past elections. However, most observers also 
concurred that the outcome was heavily influenced by the PRI's 
tremendous advantages in resources, media coverage, and organiza-
tional capacity—advantages the ruling party derived from its privi-
leged relationship with the state. Not only did PRI candidates benefit 
greatly from some communities' reliance on government social pro-
grams such as PRONASOL and PROCAMPO, but the party also 
continued to draw on government personnel and state resources to 
support its campaign despite laws expressly prohibiting such prac-
tices.55 The ruling party also dominated mass media coverage, a 
situation produced both by the PRI's disproportionate access to finan-
cial resources for media advertising and by the close relationship 
between state officials and privately owned media companies.56 
Moreover, the PRI enjoyed tremendous mobilizational advantages 
because of entrenched clientelist relations. In many poor neighbor-
hoods and rural areas, local party leaders conditioned citizens' access 
to social services, government subsidies, and other benefits on their 
expressed commitment to vote for the ruling party.57 Government-
allied labor unions also demonstrated in 1994 that they retained the 
capacity to mobilize an important proportion of their members in 
support of the "official" party (San Francisco Chronicle, August 17, 
1994, p. 1A). Indeed, because Ernesto Zedillo won the PRI's presiden-
tial nomination under difficult circumstances and had a compara-
tively short time in which to organize a national campaign, his victory 
owed much to the continued mobilizational capacity of the PRI's 
traditional social allies. These deeply rooted relationships, a product 
of the PRI's long incumbency, remained largely unaffected by elec-
toral reforms. 
55The advantages accruing to the PRI are discussed in El Financiero, July 6,1994, p. 3; 
Porque, July 6, 1994, pp. 13-15; Reforma, July 15, 1994, p. 4. 
^See the detailed analyses of media coverage in Academia Mexicana de Derechos 
Humanos 1994a, 1994b, 1994c. 
57For examples, see El Financiero International, August 29-September 4,1994, p. 13, and New 
York Times, August 28,1994, section 4, p. 4. Some of the electoral reforms adopted in 1993 and 
1994 (especially measures designed to protect the secrecy of the vote and prohibitions against 
campaigning near polling stations) made it more difficult for government officials and PRI 
organizers to enforce compliance. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the impact that 
this kind of voter coercion may have on citizens who are not fully aware of their political rights. 
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Given these considerations, what would be required for a success-
ful transition to democracy in Mexico? Although specific organiza-
tional arrangements and political practices vary significantly from 
one country to another, there is considerable consensus on the mini-
mum criteria for democracy. The elemental requirements are the 
guarantee of (often constitutionally defined) individual rights, in-
cluding freedoms of expression and association and especially protec-
tion against arbitrary state action; frequently scheduled, fairly con-
ducted elections in which all citizens are fully free to participate 
(universal suffrage) in the selection of representatives who will exer-
cise public authority; and institutionalized procedures to ensure that 
citizens can through the rule of law hold rulers accountable for their 
public actions.58 These requirements are mutually reinforcing. 
Unlike many instances of regime change, the transition to democ-
racy in Mexico does not involve a shift from a military junta or some 
other regime of exception to an elected civilian government. Indeed, 
one of the principal challenges in the Mexican case is to make effective 
the rights and procedures already formally guaranteed by the 1917 
Constitution and by law. More specifically, changes in three areas 
would be necessary to bring about a successful transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule: the effective guarantee of citizenship 
rights; reforms that ensure equality of opportunity in electoral com-
petition; and the elimination of political controls on association and 
nonelectoral forms of mass participation. The common challenge in 
each of these areas is to limit the power of the Mexican state in its 
relations with individual citizens and the organizations of civil soci-
ety. 
Despite a long tradition of constitutional rule and formal guaran-
tees of individual liberties, the exercise of citizenship rights remains a 
highly contested political arena in Mexico. There are no significant 
legal restrictions on the rights to vote or campaign for public office. 
But political activists are victims of physical violence or forced disap-
pearance sufficiently frequently to cause many individuals to view 
the public expression of political views as risky.59 Nor does the legal 
system adequately guarantee citizens equal treatment under the 
law.60 In these and other contexts, the goal must be to make individ-
uals secure against arbitrary government actions and increase the 
HThis definition draws on discussions in Dahl 1971: 2-9,1982:10-11; O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986: 7-11; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 
1992:10, 43-44. Schmitter and Karl (p. 81) emphasize that democracy also requires that 
popularly elected officials be able to exercise their constitutional authority without 
overriding pressure from unelected officials, especially the military. 
59
 For specificaccounts, see among others Amnistia Internacionall986; Americas Watch 
1990; Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez 1992. 
60
 For a careful analysis of Mexico's legal system, see Rubio, Magaloni, and Jaime 1994. 
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effectiveness of institutionalized procedures through which citizens 
can hold agents of the state (including the police) accountable for their 
public actions. 
Additional legal-modifications and procedural changes are also 
required to equalize the terms of electoral competition in Mexico. In 
particular, much more needs to be done to reduce disparities between 
the PRI and opposition parties in terms of access to mass media 
(especially radio and television) and financial resources. At the same 
time, further steps are necessary to increase the autonomy of electoral 
authorities, especially at state and local levels. The most significant 
issue in this area is the continued close relationship between the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party and the state apparatus. Only when 
the PRI has begun to compete for power without undue advantages 
from incumbency will electoral contests become meaningful tests of 
parties' programmatic positions and candidates' personal appeal. 
Civil service reforms that limit the extent of partisan control over 
middle- and lower-level positions in the state bureaucracy would 
facilitate such a change by making it more difficult for the ruling party 
to mobilize public employees on its behalf. Whether meaningful 
change can occur in this area while PRIistas control the federal 
executive remains an open question. 
Equally important, the liberalization of electoral procedures in 
Mexico has not yet been accompanied by a significant reduction in 
political restrictions on the right of association and nonelectoral forms 
of mass participation. Establishing the political independence of 
social organizations is a decisive step in the transition from authori-
tarian to democratic rule. Respect for associational rights is crucial to 
democratization because what is at stake is the capacity of citizens to 
organize in defense of their interests without fear of state intervention 
or sanction (Fox 1994:152). Increased associational autonomy vis-a-vis 
the state is also vitally important for holding government officials 
accountable for their public actions.61 Yet in Mexico, state officials 
continue to exercise strong controls over association (especially by 
workers and peasants) and nonelectoral forms of mass participation 
such as strikes, 
A core question concerning democratization in Mexico is whether 
these multiple challenges can be resolved incrementally, or whether 
the transition to democracy will necessarily involve a sharp break 
with past political practices. The trajectory followed by Mexican 
"Schmitter (1992: 430, 437) correctly emphasizes that undemocratic patterns of 
state-society relations may persist long after electoral rules change. He notes that 
interest associations created under authoritarian rule may themselves seek to maintain 
their privileged relationship with the state. As a result, the transition to more demo-
cratic patterns of state-society relations may be quite slow, especially where regime 
change does not involve a dramatic political rupture. 
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governments thus far has clearly been one of incremental liberaliza-
tion, a process that has contributed to greater political openness but 
which has not yet produced democracy. The outcome of the 1994 
elections (a larger margin of victory for the PRI than had been 
expected in a context of high voter turnout and extensive national and 
international election observation62), as well as the virtual certainty 
that the Institutional Revolutionary Party will dominate the federal 
government until the end of the century, necessarily raise questions 
concerning whether Mexico's governing political elite will continue to 
follow this gradualist path in lieu of democratization (Loaeza, this 
volume). Indeed, much public debate in the aftermath of the 1994 
elections focused on whether Zedillo, the PRI's victorious presidential 
candidate, would be inclined or able to push forward the process of 
political reform (see, for example, Castaneda 1994b; Cornelius and 
Bailey 1994). 
The extent to which future political reforms will move Mexico closer 
to democracy will depend heavily on the vigilance and continued 
pressure of organized groups in civil society. Major opposition parties 
and pro-democracy civic organizations will play an especially significant 
role in this regard. The presence of a greater number of autonomous 
popular organizations can also help erode clientelist practices and exact 
greater accountability from political parties and state officials. Moreover, 
the actions of such groups may well determine whether the government 
will seek peaceful, negotiated outcomes or resort to repression in 
response to crises (such as the Chiapas uprising) that erupt if the pace of 
incremental reform proves too slow. 
There are many analysts, however, who question whether a demo-
cratic regime can emerge in Mexico as the result of a gradual process of 
political reform. In particular, they doubt the outcome of a piecemeal 
liberalization process overseen, ultimately, by state officials linked to the 
PRI. For these critics, the credibility of elections may remain in doubt so 
long as the PRI continues to win. As Whitehead (this volume) cogently 
argues, a successful democratic transition would require convincing 
evidence that the regime's "basic operating principles" had changed. The 
minimal conditions for satisfying this criterion would be clear separation 
62The PRI won 50.2 percent of the valid votes cast in the presidential election, while the 
PAN won 26.7 percent and the PRD won 17.1 percent. If one includes annulled ballots and 
those cast for unregistered candidates, the PRI's share was 48.8 percent of the total 
presidential vote. Using these same criteria, Salinas's proportion of the total vote in 1988 
was 48.7 percent. 
The other officially registered parties competing in the 1994 federal elections were the 
Socialist Popular Party (PPS), the Party of the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction 
(PFCRN), the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), the Mexican Democratic 
Party (PDM), the Mexican Green Party (PVEM), and the Labor Party (PT). Of these six 
parties, only the Labor Party surpassed the 1.5 percent minimum threshold established by 
law to retain its official registration; it received 2.8 percent of the valid votes cast in the 
presidential election. For vote totals by party, see IFE 1994. 
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of the PRI from the state bureaucracy stronger limits on presidential 
authority and unambiguous signs that the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party—a party born in power—was at last prepared to lose. 
Even so, for many observers democracy in Mexico will only be 
possible—and made manifest—when the presidency finally passes 
from PRI to opposition party control. This is, however, a problematic test 
of democratic transition because other, intermediate scenarios may also 
signal that significant advances toward the effective guarantee of citi-
zenship rights, equality of opportunity in electoral competition, free-
dom of association, and increased openness in nonelectoral participation 
have taken place. These scenarios include coalition government at the 
national level (with one or more opposition parties controlling key 
cabinet positions) and an opposition majority in the Congress, which 
could put an end to presidential dominance of the legislature. 
Democratization, of course, may not proceed evenly at all levels and 
in all arenas. Even opposition control of the federal executive need not 
substantially (nor automatically) affect established state controls over 
nonelectoral forms of mass participation or extend full citizenship rights 
to traditionally marginalized sectors of the population. For these rea-
sons, attention to changing relations between key social actors and the 
state may remain an important basis for assessing the contradictory and 
highly contingent process of political transition in Mexico. 
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